THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING
THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE:
DEFERENCE OR ACTIVISM?
James E. McGuire*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township,'
thereby establishing the Mount Laurel doctrine. This case, known
as Mount Laurel I, was followed by the two supreme court cases
that further refined the doctrine: the 1983 case known as Mount
Laurel H2 and the 1986 case known as Mount Laurel 11I.3 At its
base, the doctrine requires that every developing municipality in
New Jersey provide, through its zoning, a realistic opportunity
for its fair share of the region's present and prospective need for
lower income housing.4 The court's determination implicitly ordained that if sound planning allows housing for the rich, it must
also allow housing for the poor.5 If, by the same sound planning
principles, it allows factories and commerce, it must find space
wherein its workers can affordably live. 6 Since 1975, all three
branches of state government have been wrestling with the problem of how to meet the constitutional obligation imposed by
Mount Laurel.
This Essay seeks to review the Mount Laurel doctrine as
* A.B., Lafayette College; M.P.A., Rutgers University; J.D., Seton Hall Law
School. The author has been employed by the Department of the Public Advocate
since its inception in 1974. He has served as Deputy Director of the Division of
Citizen Complaints and Dispute Settlements, Director and Chief Mediator of the
Center for Public Dispute Resolution and Rate Case Analyst at the Division of Rate
Counsel.
1 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)
[hereinafter Mount Laurel I].
2 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158,
456 A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II].
3 The Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Township, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986)
[hereinafter Mount Laurel III].
4 Mount Laurel 1, 67 NJ. at 174. As the Mount Laurel II court observed, the basis
for the constitutional obligation is simple: "The State controls the use of land, all
of the land. In exercising that control, it cannot favor rich over poor....
And the
same applies to the municipality, to which this control over land has been constitutionally delegated." Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.
5 Id. at 211, 456 A.2d at 416.
6 Id.
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enunciated in Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel H; the legislative
response as set forth in the Fair Housing Act ("Act") 7 and as upheld in Mount Laurel III; and the implementation of the Act by the
Council on Affordable Housing ("COAH") as viewed from postMount Laurel III litigation. Of crucial relevance is the judiciary's
role since the supreme court's ringing endorsement, in Mount
Laurel III, of the legislative response to the Mount Laurel mandate.
This Essay critically examines New Jersey courts' participation
since the passage of the Fair Housing Act to discern whether the
judiciary's involvement has been meaningful and whether it is
likely to continue, if not increase.
Section II reviews the Mount Laurel doctrine established in
Mount Laurel I and affirmed in Mount Laurel H. It also reviews the
extraordinary measures the supreme court took in Mount Laurel II
to enforce the constitutional obligation and ensure that developing municipalities provide their aforementioned fair share.
Those measures included adoption of the State Development
Guide Plan as a tool for identifying developing municipalities;
definition of "fair share," "realistic opportunity" and other key
terms; provision for a builder's remedy; and judicial management
of all Mount Laurel litigation through three specially designated
judges. Additionally, a review of AMG Realty Co. v. Warren Township,8 illustrates how the Mount Laurel judges implemented Mount
Laurel H with respect to determination and allocation of fair
share.
Section III reviews the 1985 Fair Housing Act, the legislative
response to Mount Laurel. The Act set forth a statutory scheme
intended to satisfy the Mount Laurel doctrine's constitutional
mandate.9 That scheme established an administrative agency,
COAH, and empowered it to develop and administer a program
to enable participating municipalities to meet their constitutional
obligation. The Act also sought to abrogate courts' responsibility over Mount Laurel-type issues"° by establishing a mediation
and review process at COAH and providing for the transfer of
pending litigation to COAH. Finally, the Act provided for a moratorium on the judicially imposed builder's remedy. Mount Laurel
III affirmed the Act's validity, sanctioned the transfer of virtually
all pending litigation to COAH and warned that the judiciary's
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to 329 (West 1986).
8 207 N.J. Super. 388, 504 A.2d 692 (Law Div. 1984).
9 Mount Laurel HI, 103 N.J. at 20, 510 A.2d at 631-32.
10 Id. at 49, 510 A.2d at 647.
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deference to the legislature and COAH in no way signaled its
abdication of its role, should the Act result in nothing but
delay. "
Section IV reviews post-Mount Laurel III litigation with respect to COAH's implementation of the statutory scheme set
forth in the Act. In examining the post-Mount Laurel III cases,
this Essay seeks to determine the extent to which courts have deferred to COAH and the statutory scheme for meeting the Mount
Laurel obligation, have retreated from handling Mount Laurel disputes, and have sought to ensure that the constitutional obligation of the Mount Laurel doctrine is met.
The Essay concludes that the courts have deferred, to a significant extent, to the legislature, COAH and the statutory
scheme. While available evidence suggests that the courts have
reduced their involvement in Mount Laurel cases where the municipality is a participant in COAH's procedures, it is not possible
to conclude that the courts have completely withdrawn from the
field due to the large number of non-participant municipalities.
The Essay also concludes that courts have, thus far, met their obligation of ensuring that the constitutional obligation is met,
although fewer realistic opportunities will likely be created under
COAH's methods than would have gone forward had the agenda
set by Mount Laurel II continued in effect. Finally, the Essay concludes that increased judicial involvement is likely.
II.
A.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND:

THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE

Mount Laurel I

In establishing what is known as the Mount Laurel doctrine,
the Mount Laurel I court framed the legal issue confronting it as:
[W]hether a developing municipality like Mount Laurel may
validly, by a system of land use regulation, make it physically
and economically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the municipality for the various categories of
persons who need and want it and thereby, as Mount Laurel
has, exclude such people from living within its confines be2
cause of the limited extent of their income and resources.'
The court concluded that every developing municipality in New
Jersey must:
[B]y its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically
IId. at 65, 510 A.2d at 655.
12 Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724.
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possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More
specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity
of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford
that opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's
fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefor. These obligations must be met unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating
peculiar circumstances
which dictate that it should not be re13
quired so to do.
This doctrine, as stated by subsequent cases and commentators, requires that a developing municipality provide, through its zoning, a
realistic opportunity for fulfilling its fair share of the region's present and prospective need for lower income housing.' 4
In reaching this result, the Mount Laurel I court firmly grounded
its decision in the New Jersey Constitution. The court reasoned that
land use regulations would come validly within the purview of the
police power of New Jersey.' 5 With respect to restrictions on the
exercise of police power, all such enactments, whether at the state
or local level, must at the most elementary level meet the state substantive due process and equal protection requirements.' 6 As with
all legislative endeavors involving the police power, zoning regulations must also further the general welfare, morals, health and
safety. Enactments to the contrary are invalid.' 7
The supreme court clearly viewed the general welfare regulation as transcending municipal boundaries. The court proffered
that the effects of regulation on citizens other than those in a distinct municipality should be given due respect.' 8 In support of this
principle, the Mount Laurel I court quoted a 1949 opinion of Chief
Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt:
13 Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
14 Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Township, 209 N.J. Super.
393, 403, 507 A.2d 768, 773-74 (Law Div. 1985).
15 Mount Laurel !, 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725. Specifically, the New Jersey
Constitution authorizes legislative delegation of land use regulation to municipalities. The legislature retains, however, the right to modify or revoke such delegation. In 1928, the legislature delegated zoning powers to municipalities in the
Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which was repealed in 1976. Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:55-30 to -45 (repealed 1976). The Mount Laurel I court stated "it is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of the state
and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in
the same manner as is the state." Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
16 Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725.
17 Id. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725.
18 Id. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
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The effective development of a region should not and cannot
be made to depend upon the adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed decades or even centuries
ago, and based in many instances on consideration of geography, of commerce, or of politics that are no longer significant
with respect to zoning. The direction of growth of residential
areas on the one hand and of industrial concentration on the
other refuses to be governed by such artificial lines. Changes
in methods of transportation as well as in living conditions
have served only to accentuate the unreality in dealing with
zoning problems on the basis of the territorial limits of a
municipality. 9
In Mount Laurel I, the supreme court observed that the local exercise of zoning powers is potentially unconstitutional where, as in
Mount Laurel Township, zoning enactments restrict the availability
of housing to limited segments of the population.20 In examining
Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance, the court found that it did not
comport with a general welfare standard and was not within the purview of the legitimate orbit of zoning power.2 ' Specifically, Mount
Laurel's zoning scheme allocated the township's 14,000 acres to
three categories of use. Nearly 10,000 acres or about seventy percent was designated residential, 4121 acres or 29.2 percent was
zoned for industry and 169 acres or 1.2 percent was zoned for retail
business. The court found that zoning nearly thirty percent or 4100
acres of land for industry was unreasonable in that only 100 acres
had been developed for industrial purposes in the prior decade. 2 2
19 Id. at 177-78, 336 A.2d at 726-27 (quoting Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v.
Cresskill Borough, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949)).
20 The court declared that:
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing

of all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulation.
Further the universal and constant need for such housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the general welfare which
developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends
beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the
claimed good of the particular municipality. It has to follow that,

broadly speaking, the presumptive obligation arises for each such municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations,
the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing, including, of course, low and moderate housing costs, to
meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who
may desire to live within its boundaries. Negatively, it may not adopt
regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that opportunity.
Id. at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 727-28.
21
22

Id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730.
Id. at 184, 336 A.2d at 730.
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By zoning such a large amount for industry, Mount Laurel had reduced the amount of land available for residential purposes.
With respect to residential zoning, the Mount Laurel ordinance
provided only for "single family, detached dwellings, one house per
lot," i.e., typical suburban developments.2 3 Further, zoning requirements called for minimum lot size of 20,000 square feet, minimum frontage of 100 feet and minimum dwelling floor area of 1100
square feet for a one story dwelling and 1300 for dwellings of more
than one story. 24 The supreme court found the cumulative impact
of these zoning requirements preclusive of adequate single family
housing except for those families of middle-class means and
above.

25

While Mount Laurel provided for some multifamily units by
agreement, it did so in a manner that excluded low and moderate
income families: 26 by sharply limiting the number of units with
more than one bedroom. 2 7 It then sought to exclude school-age
children from occupying any one bedroom apartment and to limit
two bedroom units to a maximum of two school-age children.2 8
Penalties were imposed on the developer if, in the aggregate, "more
than .3 school children per multi-family unit... attend the township
school system in any one year .... "29 The court found that the
intent of the restrictions was to reduce local tax-funded education
costs by restricting the number of school-age children in the municipality, a conclusion found not to promote the general welfare. 3 °
After finding Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance presumptively
invalid, the supreme court considered the principal fiscal reasons
advanced by the Township in support of its zoning plan. Mount
Laurel asserted that it sought industrial ratables as a means of addressing the increasingly heavy burden of local taxes. The Mount
Laurel I court found that a municipality cannot both seek the benefits of development and be excused from the burdens. The court,
striking a societal balance, mandated that when zoning for industry
and commerce to obtain tax advantages, a municipality must also
provide for adequate housing stock, theoretically to be used by its
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.,
Id.

at 163, 336 A.2d at 719.
at 183, 336 A.2d at 729-30.

at 182, 336 A.2d at 729.
at 168, 336 A.2d at 721.
336 A.2d at 721-22.
at 183, 336 A.2d at 729.
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employees. 3 '
The court, in summarizing Mount Laurel's responsibility,
opined that a developing municipality must give potential residents,
including lower income families, a realistic opportunity to choose
the type of dwelling in which they desire to live. 32 The court held
that a municipality should have the initial opportunity to proceed,
however, without court intervention.3 3 Pursuant to this, the court
granted ninety days to Mount Laurel Township to remedy the deficiencies with correcting amendments.3 4 If, however, Mount Laurel
did not perform, the court indicated that judicial intervention, by a
supplementary proceeding, would be the proper course of action.3 5
B.

Mount Laurel II

Eight years after the supreme court's Mount Laurel I decision,
Mount Laurel Township continued to overtly discriminate
against lower echelons of society through ordinances designed to
exclude poor families considering low income housing stock.3 6
Based on its belief that Mount Laurel's inaction was an example
of pervasive non-compliance with the Mount Laurel doctrine's
constitutional mandate, the supreme court consolidated six cases
37
known as Mount Laurel H.
In Mount Laurel II the court reaffirmed the constitutional basis for the Mount Laurel doctrine and its firm commitment to making the doctrine work.3 8 Writing for the court, Chief Justice
Wilentz also addressed open issues with respect to developing
municipalities, determination and allocation of fair share low and
moderate income housing needs, mandatory affirmative action
and the builder's remedy. In ruling on these issues the supreme
court sought to encourage voluntary compliance, simplify litigation and substantially increase the judicial remedy's effectiveId. at 187, 336 A.2d at 732.
Id., 336 A.2d at 731-32.
33 Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
34 Id. at 191, 336 A.2d at 734.
35 Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
36 Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 198, 456 A.2d at 410.
37 As one commentator has noted: "Frustrated by 'widespread non-compliance'
with the constitutional obligation it had articulated, and angered at perceived municipal resistance and inactivity by the coordinating branches of government and
the private sector, the Court took it upon itself to 'put some steel into [the Mount
Laurel] doctrine.' " Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey Supreme
Court'sJudiciousRetreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30, 32 (1988) (quoting Mount Laurel
11, 92 N.J. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410).
38 Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
31

32
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ness. 39 Finally, with respect to its own role, the court declared
that "[w]e may not build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution .... The judicial role ... will expand to the extent that we
remain virtually alone in this field." 4 ° The court then proceeded
to develop its own devices for dealing with Mount Laurel cases.
1.

Constitutional Basis

The Mount Laurel doctrine's constitutional basis remains unchanged from its articulation in Mount Laurel L41 The Mount Laurel H court explained that:
The basis for the constitutional obligation is simple: The State
controls the use of land, all of the land. In exercising that control it cannot favor rich over poor. It cannot legislatively set
aside dilapidated housing in urban ghettos for the poor and
decent housing elsewhere for everyone else. The government
that controls this land represents everyone. While the State
may not have the ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use
that condition as the basis for imposing further disadvantages.
And the same applies to the municipality, to which this control
over land has been constitutionally delegated.4 2
2.

Closing the Definitional Gaps

At the outset, ChiefJustice Wilentz raised several questions,
the uncertainty of which was an obstacle to effective implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine. Specifically, the Mount Laurel H
court identified the following issues: the definitions of "developing municipality" and "region," and how the latter is to be determined; the method by which the "fair share" within a region is to
be calculated; and the actions that a municipality must undertake
to "affirmatively afford" an opportunity for lower income housing to be constructed. 43 Regarding the so-called builder's remedy, the justices sought to determine when a court should order
the issuance of a building permit on behalf of a developer who
under Mount Laurel challenged a zoning ordinance and prevailed.4 4 The supreme court also aimed to guide the judiciary in
dealing with the complex procedural matters involved in Mount
39
40

41
42
43
44

Id. at 214, 456
Id. at 213, 456
Id. at 208, 456
Id. at 209, 456
Id. at 205, 456
Id.

A.2d
A.2d
A.2d
A.2d
A.2d

at
at
at
at
at

418.
417.
415.
415.
413.
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Laurel litigation. 4 5
These questions follow sequentially the issues that must be
dealt with in Mount Laurel litigation; they will be discussed, in
turn, in the remainder of this section.
a.

Developing Municipalities

The threshold question involves determining the municipality's obligations, if any, under Mount Laurel.4 6 The previous standard of what constituted a "developing municipality" created
much uncertainty. Accordingly, the court adopted the State Development Guide Plan (SDGP) and held that based on the concept map of SDGP, municipalities containing growth areas must
meet the prospective need obligations.4 7
The SDGP was the only official document in which the state
set forth "a statewide blueprint for future development. ' 48 The
SDGP was developed pursuant to state law by the administrative
agency with responsibility for developing a master plan to guide
the state's growth. 4 9 Thus, the SDGP had the benefit of legislative authorization and agency expertise.
The SDGP identified and targeted growth areas appropriate
for development. The plan, designed for use as a policy statement regarding the state's development, 50 was used by state
agencies to guide their infrastructure investments. 5 ' Further,
municipalities were using the SDGP to proceed in the evaluation
of the proper locations for future development and housing
stock.5 2
The Mount Laurel H court clearly favored the SDGP, with its
legislative authorization, agency expertise, presumptive validity
and practical use.5 3 It was clear to the supreme court that Mount
Laurel's prospective need obligations should be coterminous with
the state's future development plan.5 4 Accordingly, the court
held that the Mount Laurel obligation applied only to municipaliId.
Id. at 223, 456 A.2d at 422.
Id. at 240, 456 A.2d at 431.
Id. at 225, 456 A.2d at 423.
Id. at 225-26, 456 A.2d at 423-24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-15.52 (West
1979).
50 Mount Laurel H, at 230, 456 A.2d at 426 (quoting State Development Guide
Plan, May 1980, at ii).
51 Id. at 235, 456 A.2d at 429.
52 Id. at 233, 456 A.2d at 428.
53 Id. at 243, 456 A.2d at 433.
54 Id. at 226, 456 A.2d at 424.
45
46
47
48
49
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ties in the SDGP's "growth areas" with provision for certain exceptions. 55 Thus, the court eliminated much uncertainty as to
which municipalities faced Mount Laurel obligations.
b.

"FairShare"

The next step was to determine a given municipality's "fair
share" of the Mount Laurel obligation. 56 To determine the "fair
share," it is necessary to identify the relevant region, determine
present and prospective housing needs for that region and allocate such needs on a municipal basis. 57 Recognizing the com-

plexity, magnitude and amount of time required to make a
determination, the Mount Laurel H court clearly indicated that
such determinations are more appropriately ferreted out through
administrative agency action because court litigation is both
costly and inefficient. 5 8
In the absence of action by the executive and legislative
branches, however, the judiciary was left to enforce the constitutional obligation underlying the Mount Laurel doctrine.59 The
Mount Laurel H court chose to restrict all Mount Laurel litigation to

three judges, selected by the ChiefJustice, who would hear cases
in one of three designated regions. The court anticipated that a
regional pattern would emerge from each of the three areas after
several cases were tried, and that a certain consistency would develop, first by region, then statewide.60 The judges' determinations with respect to region and regional need were, like
determinations of administrative agencies, to be deemed presumptively valid.6 '
By utilizing this approach to "fair share," the court expected
that it would be able to limit itself to allocative issues within the
fair share question in a short period of time leaving all other issues to the coordinate branches of state government.62 The only
55 Id. at 226-27, 456 A.2d at 424.

56 Id. at 248-58, 456 A.2d at 436-4 1. The court described the calculation of fair
share as "[t]he most troublesome issue in Mount Laurel litigation .... " Id. at 248,
456 A.2d at 436. According to the court, determining a municipality's fair share
"takes the most time, produces the greatest variety of opinions, and engenders
doubt as to the meaning and wisdom of lount Laurel." Id.

57 Id.
58 Id. at 250 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Township, 72 N.J.
481, 499 n.5, 371 A.2d 1192, 1200 n.5 (1977)).
59 Id. at 252, 456 A.2d at 438.
60 Id. at 254, 456 A.2d at 439.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 255, 456 A.2d at 439.
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guidance that the supreme court offered with respect to fair share
was that it favored formulas in which local employment opportunities factored heavily in the equation. 6 The court explicated
that it disfavored formulas that stagnated, by way of present low
income resident ratios, the lower income housing market.64 In
addition, the supreme court viewed formulas that unreasonably
diminished the lower income housing share, manifested through
the municipality's past successful exclusion, as being an untoward result.65
c.

"Affording a Realistic Opportunity "for Affordable Housing

The next step was action. Invoking the court's opinion in
Mount Laurel I, Chief Justice Wilentz reiterated that municipalities' constitutional obligation of providing realistic opportunities
for property development of low and moderate income housing
would be satisfied if the municipalities strived to commit an equitable proportion to the regional housing needs now and in the
future. 66 Satisfaction of this obligation was to be determined by
an objective test. The municipality must have afforded, in fact,
realistic opportunities for the development of its fair share of
housing serving low and middle income families. 67 Under this
objective approach, good faith was now irrelevant and the numberless approach, whereby neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
was required to prove a "fair share" figure, 68 was no longer
acceptable.69
To insure action, the Mount Laurel H court gave greater definition to key terms. "Affordable" meant that a family "pays no
more than 25 percent of its income for [affordable] housing. '"70
The court observed that .'[a]ffirmative,' in the Mount Laurel rule,
suggests that the municipality is going to do something, and 'realistic opportunity' suggests that what it is going to do will make it
realistically possible for lower income housing to be built."'"
Thus, municipalities were required to at least neutralize all
63

64
65
66

724).

Id. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205, 456 A.2d at 413 (citing Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at

Id. at 221, 456 A.2d at 421.
See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Township, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977).
69 Id. at 222, 456 A.2d at 422.
70 Id. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8.
71 Id. at 260-61, 456 A.2d at 442.
67
68
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barriers that denied the construction of low and middle income
housing. 72 If this action alone were sufficient to meet its obligation, consistent with the above definition, then no further action
was required. If removal of restrictive barriers alone would not
provide a realistic opportunity, however, affirmative measures
would be necessary.73
The Mount Laurel H court envisioned several affirmative
measures. Among these proposals were the use of available
housing subsidies from the state or federal government" and
density bonuses, whereby permitted densities were increased
proportionate to the amount of lower income housing provided.75 Chief Justice Wilentz also suggested mandatory set
asides of a certain percentage of units for lower income housing 76 and least-cost housing. The court opined that these units
should be produced with low cost as the primary objective while
still providing the tenants with healthy and safe living arrangements. 7 7 Such least-cost housing would satisfy a Mount Laurel obligation only where all restrictive barriers were removed and all
affirmative steps considered.78
d.

Builder's Remedy

Based on the court's prior experience with municipal noncompliance, the Chief Justice recognized that builder's remedies
must be fostered so that Mount Laurel compliance can be more
readily attained. 9 Mount Laurel H clarified the conditions under
which, and increased the frequency with which, a builder's remedy could be granted.80
The supreme court stated that where a trial court determined that a municipality did not meet its Mount Laurel obligation, and after being ordered to do so, failed to revise its zoning
ordinance, the municipality would be subject to a number of
remedies for noncompliance. For instance, a plaintiff-developer
proposing construction of a substantial low income housing project is granted a builder's remedy upon the builder's success in a
72

Id. at 258-59, 456 A.2d at 441.

73 Id. at 261, 456 A.2d at 443.
74 Id. at 262, 456 A.2d at 443.

Id.
Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
75
76

at
at
at
at
at
at

266, 456 A.2d at 445.
267-68, 456 A.2d at 446.
218, 456 A.2d at 420.
217, 456 A.2d at 419-20.
279, 456 A.2d at 452.
278, 456 A.2d at 452.
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Mount Laurel litigation. 8 ' In rebuttal to this prima facie case,
however, a municipality could prove that the developer's proposed project is infeasible under land use planning principles.8 2
Thus, the burden for showing that a builder's remedy should be
denied shifts to the municipality.
e. Judicial Remedies and Management of Mount Laurel
Litigation
From the outset, the supreme court recognized the sensitivity of the role it prescribed for itself in Mount Laurel H. It clearly
thought that the legislature should deal with the Mount Laurel
matter.8 3 ChiefJustice Wilentz remarked, however, that the judiciary acted:
[F]irst and foremost because the Constitution of our State requires protection of the interests involved and because the
Legislature has not protected them ....

So while we have al-

ways preferred legislative to judicial action in this field, we
shall continue -

until the Legislature acts

-

to do our best to

uphold the constitutional obligation that underlies the Mount
Laurel doctrine.8 4
The court, in a prophetic statement, gave notice that its role would
expand if the legislative and executive branches continued to stand
aside and do nothing. Correspondingly, the court stated that its
role would contract to the extent there was an adequate response
from the other branches.
To manage effectively Mount Laurel litigation in its expanded judicial role, the supreme court took several significant steps. It determined that all Mount Laurel litigation would be handled by one of
only three judges specially designated by the Chief Justice. 85 Furthermore, such litigation would be managed in a manner that would
dispose of all aspects of the case in one trial and one appeal.8 6 The
supreme court also mandated that the trial court could appoint special masters to facilitate a proper remedy.8 7
The Mount Laurel H court expected that a certain degree of consistency and predictability would result from three judges handling
Id. at
Id.
83 Id. at
84 Id. at
85 Id. at
86 Id. at
87 Id.
81

279-80, 456 A.2d at 452.

82

212, 456 A.2d at 417.
212-13, 456 A.2d at 417.
216, 456 A.2d at 419.
218, 456 A.2d at 420.
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all Mount Laurel litigation.8 8 These judges, each assigned a region,
would develop a systematic approach for dealing with issues relating
to the definition of the region itself, the determination of present
and protective need in each region and a methodology for allocating
that need on a municipal basis. The court expected that 89this systematic approach would eventually have a statewide effect.
Special masters were to be liberally used to facilitate court-ordered revisions of municipal zoning ordinances that did not satisfy
local Mount Laurel obligations. The special masters would combine
substantive planning expertise with impartiality and thereby help
the parties and the court to satisfy the constitutional obligation.90
The special master's position was to save the court time and supplement the court's developing expertise by alleviating it of the burden
of delving into fine revisions of zoning ordinances. 9 '
The supreme court structured future Mount Laurel litigation in
such a manner as to minimize the constitutional difficulties of zoning compliance.9 2 Trial judges were given a strong hand that would
enable them to dispose of all issues in one trial and prescribe specific remedies for non-compliance.93
The Mount Laurel H court did not rush into these actions lightly.
Chief Justice Wilentz, recognizing the separation of powers issues,
declined to act in such a manner that could be viewed as aggrandizing the court's power at the expense of the executive or legislature. 94 The supreme court had given fair warning eight years earlier
in Mount Laurel I when it premonished that "[s]hould Mount Laurel
not perform as we expect, further judicial action may be sought by
supplemental pleading in this cause."' 95 The court gave further notice in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Township,96 five years
before Mount Laurel H, when it declared that:
In Mount Laurel we elected not to impose direct judicial supervision of compliance with the judgement in view of the advanced view of zoning law as applied to housing laid down by
[the] opinion. The present case is different. The basic law is
by now settled ....

The focus of the judicial effort after six

years of litigation must now be transferred from theorizing
Id. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
Id. at 254, 456 A.2d at 439.
Id. at 283, 456 A.2d at 454.
91 Id. at 284, 456 A.2d at 454.
92 Id. at 292, 456 A.2d at 459.
93 Id. at 285-86, 456 A.2d at 455.
94 Id. at 287, 456 A.2d at 456.
95 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
96 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
88
89
90
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over zoning to assurance of the zoning opportunity for production of least cost housing.9 7
Still, the legislative and executive branches failed to act. Finally,
with reluctance, but also with determination, the Mount Laurel II
court concluded that judicial legitimacy would be at greater risk if it
98
too failed to effectuate the constitution.
C.

Implementation: AMG Realty Co. v Warren Township
It is useful at this point to review the 1984 case of AMG Re-

alty Co. v. Warren Township 9 9 as a means of understanding how fair

share was determined in post-Mount Laurel II cases. In AMG Realty, Judge Serpentelli, one of the three specially designated
Mount Laurel judges, set forth a framework for determining fair
share and its component subparts: region, regional need and allocation of a fair share of such need. This framework was significant in that it was the first effort to establish fair share and served
as a benchmark against which the Fair Housing Act of 1985 and
post-Mount Laurel III litigation would be evaluated.
With respect to regions, Judge Serpentelli found that there
was a need to define a region for both present and prospective
needs.
The present need region was to be defined by blocks of
counties. The boundaries were intended to strike a housing balance by geographically utilizing the less dense, newer suburban
areas of each individual region with the extreme need in older
urban core municipalities.10 0
The prospective need regions were to be based on "a modified commutershed area which reflects a predetermined commuting time from the functional center of any given municipality[,]
intended to be large enough to account for special commuting
patterns or employment concentrations ... ."01 The commuter-

shed area would then be determined by a thirty-minute driving
radius in all directions from the functional center of the munici97
98

Id. at 552-53, 371 A.2d at 1227-28.
Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 287, 456 A.2d at 456.

99 207 N.J. Super. 388, 504 A.2d 692 (Law Div. 1984).

100 Id. at 399, 504 A.2d at 697-98. The result was four statewide regions: Region
I - Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic, Somerset,
Sussex, Union and Warren counties; Region II - Monmouth, and Ocean counties;
Region III - Burlington, Camden, Gloucester and Mercer counties; Region IV -

Atlantic, Cape May, Cumberland and Salem counties. Id.
101 Id., 504 A.2d at 697-98.
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pality.'0 2 Accordingly, under this approach there would be a different prospective need region for each of the state's 567
municipalities.
With respect to regional needJudge Serpentelli again determined both a present and prospective regional need. Present
need was considered to have been generated before 1980, while
prospective need was expected to be generated between 1980
and 1990.103 Present need consisted of "the indigenous need of

a municipality and the fair share of the reallocated excess need of
the municipality's present need region."' 4 A three step approach was used to determine the present regional need, which
was to be reallocated among municipalities in the region. 0 5
Prospective need was calculated using both an economic
model and a demographic model to project the number of households expected to exist in 1990. The proportion of households
required for lower income housing was then determined by mul0 6
tiplying the total 1990 expected households by 39.4 percent.'
With respect to allocation, formulas were developed to allocate a fair share of the regional need. Judge Serpentelli allocated
present need using three factors: growth area, present employment and median income. 10 7 Prospective need was based on the
above three factors plus employment growth.' °8
The AMG Realty court then adjusted the fair share allocation.
In recognition of the fact that some municipalities would not
102
103
104
105

Id. at 400, 504 A.2d at 698.
Id. at 403, 504 A.2d at 699.
Id. at 401, 504 A.2d at 698.
Id. at 402, 504 A.2d at 699. The court delineated the steps as follows:
First, the total number of substandard units in the present need region must be identified and expressed as a percentage of the total
housing stock of the region .

.

. [i.e.,] the regional substandard hous-

ing percentage. Second, the total number of substandard units for
each municipality in the present need region must be identified and
expressed as a percentage of each municipality's housing stock . . .
[i.e.,] the municipal substandard housing percentage. Third, any municipality whose percentage of substandard housing exceeds the regional percentage shall have its number of substandard housing units
reduced until it conforms to the regional percentage. The units subtracted from such a municipality shall form the pool of present need
which will be reallocated to those towns containing any growth
area ....

Id.

106 Id. at 403, 504 A.2d at 700. TheAMG Realty court commented that the 39.4%
figure "has been recognized in Mount Laurel H . . . and by most experts as the
proportion of units which will be occupied by lower income households." Id.
107 Id. at 404, 504 A.2d at 700.
108 Id. at 405, 504 A.2d at 701.
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have an adequate stock of undeveloped land to afford their fair
share of lower income housing, 0 9 a twenty percent adjustment
factor was made. Those municipalities without adequate vacant
developable land were allowed to reduce their present and prospective need allocation by twenty percent while all other municipalities were required to increase by twenty percent. Next, all the
present and prospective need allocation for all municipalities
with an obligation was increased by three percent to alleviate
problems of an insufficient amount of housing vacancies, which
would in turn facilitate choice and mobility in living
arrangements. 1 0
Finally, the AMG Realty court addressed three loose ends.
First, all selected urban aid municipalities were exempted from
fair share obligations."' Second, the court determined that the
proportion of lower income housing was to be equally divided
between low and moderate income housing." 2 Third, the fair
share obligation was to be apportioned with one-third to be met
during the first six years.' 13
III.
A.

THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO MOUNT
LAUREL: THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

Background

On January 20, 1983, when the supreme court decided
Mount Laurel II, it agreed that Mount Laurel issues were distinctly

legislative in nature, and, in acknowledging the political process,
reminded its coequal branches of government that inherent constitutional rights should not go unnoticed while awaiting political
unanimity." 4 The court further declared that the courts were
bound to enforce the constitution and signaled its readiness to
defer to substantial legislative action." 5 The court then proceeded to bolster the constitutional effectiveness of the Mount
6
Laurel doctrine. 1
OnJuly 2, 1985, the state legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act. In so doing, the legislature forged a political consensus
that affirmed the constitutional obligation set forth in the Mount
109 Id.
110 Id.

at 408, 504 A.2d at 702.

Id. at 409, 504 A.2d at 702.
Id., 504 A.2d at 702-03.
113 Id., 504 A.2d at 703.
1'4 Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417.
115 Id. at 212-14, 456 A.2d at 417-18.
116 Id. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410.
'I

112
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Laurel doctrine. The Act created an administrative agency in response to this obligation and enunciated the need for comprehensive regional and statewide planning. 1 7 Moreover, the
legislature explicitly declared its strong preference for the resolution of exclusionary zoning disputes through administrative
means rather than litigation. The legislature also declared that it
was the intent of the Act to "provide various alternatives to the
use of the builder's remedy as a method of achieving fair share
housing. "118

On February 20, 1986, fewer than eight months after its enactment, the Fair Housing Act was held constitutional by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel III. Again writing for the
court, Chief Justice Wilentz declared that the Act's provisions
were intended to meet the constitutional obligations set forth in
the Mount Laurel cases." 9 The Chief Justice continued that the
legislature's duty to effect the constitutional obligations had been
satisfied in that it acted on the judiciary's hint for action. 20 The
court further opined that manifesting in practice the Act's express intent would effectuate reasonable lower income housing
opportunities.' 2 '
The supreme court clearly recognized that the legislative intent was twofold. The Act was intended to implement the use of
an administrative agency in the complex issues surrounding
lower income housing to fulfill the constitutional obligations as
set forth by the court, and in addition, to use judicial resources
most effectively by removing the obligations from the courts and
placing the complex determinations with those best suited for the
task.' 22 With respect to the Act's first intention, the Mount Laurel
III court readily deferred to the legislature and the administrative
agency it created to respond to the Mount Laurel obligation.' 2 3
Regarding the second purpose, the court transferred virtually all
pending Mount Laurel litigation to the Council on Affordable
Housing.. and interpreted the judicially imposed builder's rem117 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986).
118

Id. § 303.

119 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 20, 510 A.2d at 631 (citations omitted).
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 46-47, 510 A.2d at 645.
Id. at 21, 510 A.2d at 632.
Id. at 49, 510 A.2d at 647.
Id.
id. at 53, 510 A.2d at 649. The court concluded that:
The Legislature intended to transfer every pending Mount Laurel action
to the Council. The exception, where 'manifest injustice' would occur, was based on the Legislature's concern that in some particular
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edy so narrowly as to render it virtually inapplicable.1 25 Chief
Justice Wilentz also issued a warning by asserting that the court
would re-enter the equation in the determination of rights if the
26
Act did not further the Mount Laurel obligations set forth. 1
B.

Overview of the Fair Housing Act

The Act addressed the legislative intent to bring an administrative agency into the Mount Laurel field by establishing COAH
and empowering it to develop and administer a program
whereby participating municipalities could meet their constitutional obligation under Mount Laurel. Specifically, the Act re27
quired COAH to determine the state's housing regions,
contemplate present and prospective lower income housing
needs at both state and regional levels 28 and adopt criteria and
guidelines for municipal determination of its present and pro29
spective fair share of the housing need in a given region.1
Thus, COAH would determine the core factors that would enable
a municipality to determine its fair share.
It is significant to note that the Act contained a number of
factors that reduced municipal fair share through credits for existing low or moderate housing,13 0 adjustment factors for municipalities with little or no room for fair share development 13 ' and
limits on the permissible number of fair share units which may be
demanded of a municipality.' 3 2 The statute also allowed a municipality to transfer up to fifty percent of its fair share to another
municipality via a contractual Regional Contribution Agreement
(RCA) subject to the approval of COAH and the appropriate
3
County Planning Board.
A municipality that chooses to participate may do so by
adopting a resolution of participation and notifying COAH of its
intent to participate. Thereafter, the municipality must submit a
case, there might be a combination of circumstances, unforeseen but
nevertheless possible, that rendered transfer so unjust as to overcome
the Legislature's clear wish to transfer all cases.
Id.

Id. at 60, 510 A.2d at 652.
Id. at 23, 510 A.2d at 633.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307(a) (West 1990).
Id. § 307(b).
Id. § 307(c)(1).
Id.
131 Id. § 307(c)(2).
132 Id. § 307(e).
133 Id. § 312.
125
126
127
128
129
130
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fair share plan and any ordinances required to implement the
housing element.I 4 The Act required that for a plan to be valid,
the housing element must be promulgated with access to afforda5
3
ble housing in mind.'

While municipal participation is voluntary, there are considerable incentives to participate. First, fair share determinations
can be reduced as described above. Second, a municipality that
files a timely plan can invoke the mediation and review procedures that are prerequisites to litigation.16 Third, a municipality
that has received substantive certification of its housing element
and ordinances is granted a six year repose from litigation challenges to its plan.' 37 Even if challenged, a COAH-certified plan
is presumed valid. 3 ' Finally, the Act established several financial
mechanisms including grants and loan programs."'
The Act addressed the legislature's second major goal of removing the judiciary from the Mount Laurel field through two provisions. Section 315 established a mediation and review process
at COAH. Disputes are first mediated and, if unresolved, are referred to the Council for review and, if necessary, transmitted to
the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. This administrative procedure must be exhausted before litigation can
be initiated. Furthermore, the Act sought to drastically reduce
Mount Laurel litigation in the courts by mandating that all litigation instituted less than sixty days before the effective date of the
Act be transferred to COAH. With regard to earlier litigation,
any party may move for transfer from the court to COAH. 4 ° Finally, the statute imposed a moratorium on the controversial and
judicially-imposed builder's remedy.' 4
C.

Mount Laurel III -

Interpretation of the Act

Promptly after enactment of the Fair Housing Act, defendant municipalities moved to transfer their cases to COAH.
Twelve of those cases became the subject of Mount Laurel III, with

five representative cases specifically selected for oral argument.
The cases raised three significant issues: (1) whether transfer of
134 Id. § 309(a).
135 Id. § 310.
136

Id. § 309.

137 Id. § 313.

Id § 317.
§ 320.
140 Id. § 316.
141 Id. § 328.
138

139 Id
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14 2
pending litigation to COAH would result in manifest injustice;
(2) whether the builder's remedy moratorium was unconstitutional;' 4 3 and (3) whether the Act was intended to satisfy the constitutional requirements without delay.' 4 4 Each issue is discussed
in turn below.

1.

Transfer of Mount Laurel Litigation to COAH

Each of the twelve Mount Laurel III appeals challenged the
trial courts' decisions on motions to transfer to COAH.' 4 5
Transfer had been denied in all but one case, which involved
Tewksbury Township. The applicable section of the Act dealing
with litigation filed more than sixty days before the effective date
of the Act requires that
any party to the litigation may file a motion with the court to
seek a transfer of the case to the council. In determining
whether or not to transfer, the court shall consider whether or
not the transfer would14 6result in a manifest injustice to any
party to the litigation.

Accordingly, the first major issue in Mount Laurel III was what constituted "manifest injustice."
The plaintiff developers and Public Advocate contended that
manifest injustice would result by virtue of delay in providing low
and moderate income units, the possibility of increased infrastructure costs and loss of development sites for low income housing developers and the concomitant damages to builders.' 4 7 The supreme
court found that there was no constitutional timetable in meeting
the Mount Laurel obligation. 14 In clear deference to COAH, the
court declared that any delay resulting from the Act's implementation was permissible as it marked the time needed for COAH to correctly perform its duties. 149 In addition, the court noted that
COAH's time frame could be a more expedient and efficient means
to an end than the judiciary's timetable as well as result in more
lower income housing than a judicial intervention could achieve.' 5 °
Thus, ChiefJustice Wilentz clearly indicated that delay did not con142

Mount Laurel 111, 103 NJ. at 38, 510 A.2d at 641.

143

Id. at 42, 510 A.2d at 643.
Id. at 41-42, 510 A.2d at 642-43.

144

145
146

Id. at 26, 510 A.2d at 635.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316 (West 1986).

147 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 25-31, 510 A.2d at 634-37.
148

Id. at 40, 510 A.2d at 642.

149 Id. at 41, 510 A.2d at 642-43.
150 Id.
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51
stitute manifest injustice.'
In determining this issue, the supreme court sought to address
what it perceived as the legislature's main purposes: to remove the
courts from the Mount Laurel field and bring an administrative
agency into it. 152 By retaining jurisdiction, the court believed that it
would thwart the state's intention of individual municipalities having the benefits of promulgating and implementing its own particularized plan.' 5 ' The court determined that if municipalities are not
allowed to reap the benefits of their own individualized plan, the
Act's growth and its statewide solution would be thwarted. 1 54 Thus,
the court concluded that COAH was to resolve every possible Mount
Laurel action. 155
There was, however, one caveat to the transfer. It was necessary to ensure that the scarce resources employed to meet a Mount
Laurel obligation, such as vacant tracts of land, sewerage capacity,
water lines or other public improvements, would still be available at
the conclusion of COAH's procedures. Accordingly, the Mount Laurel III court allowed parties to seek from the trial court conditions
designed to protect the municipality's ability to meet its Mount Laurel obligation.' 5 6

2.

Moratorium on the Builder's Remedy

The Mount Laurel III court found that the statutory restrictions on the builder's remedy were narrow and extremely limited. Moreover, the court found that the builder's remedy never
constituted a part of the constitutional obligation; rather, it was a
means to a constitutional end.' 5 7 Accordingly, the supreme court
declared that the builder's remedy was unacceptable in the face
of the legislative action imposing a moratorium.' 5 8 Again, the
of an
court was responsive to the explicit legislative declaration
159
intent to provide alternatives to the builder's remedy.
3.

Constitutionality of the Act's Fair Share Factor

In upholding the Act, the Mount Laurel III court determined
151
152
153
154
155

156
157
158
159

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 51, 510 A.2d at 648.
at 49, 510 A.2d at 647.
at 52, 510 A.2d at 648.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 62, 510 A.2d at 653.
at 42, 510 A.2d at 643.
at 42-43, 510 A.2d at 643.

at 53, 510 A.2d at 649.

N.J.

STAT. ANN. §

52:27D-303 (West 1986).
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that the statutory scheme would, if properly implemented, provide a realistic opportunity for a fair share of lower income housing. In so doing, the court clearly deferred to both the
legislature and COAH. It gave the newly created agency both
time to act and flexibility. The court adopted by reference, however, a number of key findings from Morris County Fair Housing
0
Council v. Boonton Township.16
That case was the first to interpret the Act. Judge Skillman,
one of the three specially designated Mount Laurel judges, established certain parameters designed to protect the integrity of the
Mount Laurel doctrine's constitutional obligations. Those parameters, which relate to the core fair share factors (regions, need
and allocation of regional need), are discussed below.
a.

Regions

In Mount Laurel H, the court reiterated its general approval
61
of regions that constituted the fair share housing market area.1
This definition, as implemented by Judge Serpentelli in AMG Realty Co. v. Warren Township, resulted in regions as large as eleven
counties. 16 2 By contrast, the Act defined a housing region as
a geographic area of no less than two nor more than four contiguous, whole counties which exhibit significant social, economic and income similarities, and which constitute to the
greatest extent practicable the primary metropolitan statistical
areas as last defined by the United
States Census Bureau prior
16
to the effective date of this act. 1
In Boonton Township, the plaintiffs argued that the result would
be much smaller regions that could produce two types of housing
market regions, those solely comprised of urban counties and those
with only suburban counties. 164 This instance would, in effect, prevent urban counties from satisfying their low and middle income
housing needs.' 65 Judge Skillman agreed and stated that if plaintiff's concerns materialized, satisfaction of Mount Laurel obligations
would likely not obtain in regions uniquely comprised of urban
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 26-31, 510 A.2d at 634-37.
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440 (quoting Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Madison Township, 72 N.J. 481, 543, 371 A.2d 1192, 1223
(1977)).
162 AMG Realty v. Warren Township, 207 N.J. Super. 388, 399, 504 A.2d 692,
698 (Law Div. 1984).
163 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-304(b) (West 1986).
164 Morris County Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Township, 209 N.J. Super. 393,
424, 507 A.2d 768, 785 (Law Div. 1985).
165 Id.
160
161
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counties. 166
Thus, the Boonton Township court established a constitutional
parameter that a two county region consisting of Essex and Hudson
counties would be unacceptable. The court then suggested that the
region proposed by the Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy
Research would satisfy both the legislative directives of the Act and
the constitutional objectives of the Mount Laurel doctrine.' 6 7
b.

Prospective Need

The Act required that COAH, in determining prospective
need, consider accepted applications for development, transfers
of real property and State Planning Commission projections.' 6 8
In Boonton Township, plaintiffs contended that this approach
would reward municipalities that had engaged in exclusionary
practices and had approved only a small number of development
applications in prior years.' 6 9 While the Boonton Township court
clearly deferred to the legislature, it pointed out that COAH's
ultimate obligation was to ascertain the need for low and middle
income housing based on probable projections involving development and growth. 7 ° Judge Skillman suggested that it would
be inappropriate for COAH to consider development applications in a way that would understate the growth and development
reasonably likely to occur. 171
c.

Credits

The Act provided that a municipality's fair share determination would be reduced, using a one-to-one ratio, by current individual units of adequate lower income housing.' 7 2 Additionally
included in the "crediting" formula are housing units constructed or acquired pursuant to a housing program that had the
specific intention of providing lower income housing. 17 3 In challenging this provision, the Public Advocate argued that the section would unacceptably dilute municipal fair share obligations.
74
If literally applied, the credits could far exceed statewide need. 1
166 Id., 507 A.2d at 785-86.
167 Id. at 425-26, 507 A.2d at 786.
168 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-304(j) (West 1986).
169 Boonton Township, 209 N.J. Super. at 426, 507 A.2d
170 Id. at 426-27, 507 A.2d at 787.

at 787.

171 Id. at 427, 507 A.2d at 787.
172

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

52:27D-307(c)(1) (West 1986).

173 Id.
174 Boonton Township, 209 N.J. Super. at 429, 507 A.2d at 788.
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Again, the Boonton Township court, while deferring to COAH,
established clear parameters. Judge Skillman conceded that the
Act's credits sections could be unconstitutional under the plaintiff's interpretation. 17 5 Judge Skillman reminded COAH that, if
at all possible, the legislation must be interpreted in a manner to
protect against constitutional infirmity. 76 The court then stated
that it would rest on the assumption that COAH will interpret the
credits sections with due regard to the Mount Laurel constitu77
tional obligations. 1
d.

Regional Contributions

The Act allowed for Regional Contribution Agreements
(RCAs) which allow a municipality to transfer up to 50 percent of
its fair share to another municipality. 7 ' The Boonton Township
plaintiffs argued that Mount Laurel II established that the poor
must have a realistic opportunity to live in areas where sound
planning allows the rich and middle class to live' 79 and that RCAs
contradict this principle. Judge Skillman upheld the Act's RCA
provision by pointing out that at least fifty percent of a municipality's fair share must be addressed within the municipality and
that such transfers were anticipated with approval in Mount Laurel
H. More significantly, the Boonton Township court again emphasized that all RCAs are subject to approval pursuant to COAH's
determination that the Regional Contribution Agreement grants
realistic opportunities for lower income housing as well as realistic access to jobs.18 0
4.

Deference and the Constitutional Obligation

There are two significant themes in the Mount Laurel III decision. First, the court demonstrated considerable deference to
the legislature, seeking to uphold the Act at virtually every turn.
The court also deferred to COAH by granting to the agency the
benefit of every doubt that its actions are constitutionally
permissible.
The second major theme is that the supreme court clearly
indicated that the constitutional obligation must be met. The
Id.
Id. at 430, 507 A.2d at 789.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312 (West 1986).
179 Boonton Township, 209 N.J. Super. at 431, 507 A.2d at 789.
180 Id. at 431-32, 507 A.2d at 789-90 (quoting L.1985, c.222, § 12(c), now codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(c) (West 1986)).
175
176
177
178
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court sought to demarcate for COAH the constitutional boundaries, and to point the agency in directions consistent with both
the Act and the constitutional obligation. The Mount Laurel III
court warned, however, that:
No one should assume that our exercise of comity today signals a weakening of our resolve to enforce the constitutional
rights of New Jersey's lower income citizens. The constitutional obligation has not changed; thejudiciary's ultimate duty
to enforce it has not changed; our determination to perform
that duty has not changed. What has changed is that we are no
longer alone in this field. The other branches of government
have fashioned a comprehensive statewide response to the
Mount Laurel obligation.'81
IV.

POST-MOUNT LAUREL III LITIGATION

Since February 20, 1986, when the Fair Housing Act was upheld in Mount Laurel III, there have been three subsequent New
Jersey Supreme Court decisions and approximately twelve appellate division decisions relating to Mount Laurel issues. For purposes of discussion, these cases have been categorized according
to the three basic goals of the Fair Housing Act: first, the establishment of an administrative agency (i.e., COAH) to administer
a statewide program to address the Mount Laurel doctrine;1 82 sec18 3
ond, the removal of the judiciary from the Mount Laurel field;
and third, the satisfaction of the Mount Laurel constitutional
84
obligations. 1
A.

To What Extent Have the Courts Deferred to COAH and the
Statutory Scheme for Meeting the Constitutional Obligation of
Mount Laurel ?

It is clear from an examination of a series of post-Mount Laurel III cases that New Jersey courts have consistently deferred to
COAH and the statutory scheme. For example, in Bi-County Development Corp v. Oakland Borough,' 8 5 one of the three designated
Mount Laurel judges held that COAH's fair share methodology
should be followed by trial courts hearing cases where the parties
chose not to transfer to COAH. In Hills Development Co. v.
181 Mount Laurel Ill, 103 N.J. at 65, 510 A.2d at 655.
182 Id. at 49, 510 A.2d at 647.
183 Id.

Id. at 20, 510 A.2d at 631-32 (citations omitted).
185 Bi-County Development Corp. v. Oakland Borough, 224 N.J. Super. 455, 540
A.2d 927 (Law Div. 1988).
184
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Bernards Township,' 8 6 the appellate division upheld COAH's interpretation of the Act's procedural requirements and afforded the
agency a higher level of deference because it was implementing
"new and innovative legislation." Certain substantive rules relating to fair share issues were challenged in Bernards Township v.
Department of Community Affairs 17 and Carlton Homes, Inc. v.
COAH 18 and upheld by the appellate division with only two exceptions, which were plainly contrary to the Act's literal meaning.
In Van Dalen v. Washington Township,' 8 9 the supreme court upheld
COAH's decision to use the outdated SDGP until the legislatively
designated State Department and Redevelopment Plan (State
Plan) was completed.
In Bi-County, the Borough of Oakland chose to remain in
court rather than transfer to COAH for resolution of its Mount
Laurel litigation. Although indicating its acceptance of COAH's
fair share methodology, Oakland sought the benefit of the Mount
Laurel doctrine's consensus methodology, which allowed municipalities to phase in their reallocated present need fair share obligation over three six-year periods. Thus, Oakland sought both
the benefit of COAH's smaller fair share number of 345 units,
compared to the court's fair share of 462 units, and the benefit of
phasing in the number of units over eighteen years rather than
six years. Clearly, Oakland attempted to pick and choose between the court's and COAH's different methodologies, seeking
to minimize its fair share liability and maximize the amount of
time in which to meet it.
This result was exactly what Mount Laurel III sought to avoid.
The Mount Laurel III court indicated that the legislature envisioned a comprehensive state statutory and regulatory scheme
that obtains not in the diversity of court decisions, but under the
legislature's central oversight.' 90 Moreover, the Mount Laurel III
court believed that the legislature's intention was that individual
municipalities would benefit from an all-inclusive plan and its
implementation.' 9 '
In Bi-County, Judge Skillman, quoting from Mount Laurel III,
indicated that:
While the Legislature has left a continuing role under the Act
229 N.J. Super. 318, 551 A.2d 547 (App. Div. 1988).
233 N.J. Super. 1, 558 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 1989).
244 N.J. Super. 438, 582 A.2d 1024 (App. Div. 1990).
189 120 N.J. 234, 576 A.2d 819 (1990).
190 Mount Laurel Ii, 103 N.J. at 22, 510 A.2d at 632.
191 Id. at 52, 510 A.2d at 648.
186
187
188
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for the judiciary in Mount Laurel matters, any such proceedings
before a court should conform wherever possible to the decisions, criteria, and guidelines of the Council. We do not believe the Legislature wanted lower income housing
opportunities to develop in two different directions at9 2 the
same time, contrary to sound comprehensive planning.'
Accordingly, Judge Skillman concluded that, absent an arbitrary and
capricious showing of the implementation of COAH's methodology,
trial courts in Mount Laurel adjudications not transferred to the
93
Council should defer to COAH's methodology in their decision.'
While lacking the jurisdiction of the appellate division to rule on
whether COAH's rules were valid, Judge Skillman did determine
that Oakland did not demonstrate that the COAH's regulations that
calculated Oakland's municipal fair share obligations were unfair in
their application.' 9 4 The result signaled that the courts, as pledged
in Mount Laurel III, would defer to COAH and its methodology, and
would seek to achieve consistency within the framework of the statewide statutory scheme.
In Hills Development, Bernards Township landowners adjacent to
a proposed site for Mount Laurel housing challenged COAH procedures and requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative
Law. With respect to the procedural aspects, the plaintiff landowners contended that Bernards Township did not properly adopt the
housing element prior to submission to COAH and that the municipality further omitted a settlement agreement with a Mount Laurel
developer from the housing element. Because of these deficiencies,
the plaintiffs maintained that Bernards Township's housing element
was not properly before COAH and that it was beyond the time
when the town could properly submit a housing element to COAH,
thus availing itself of the exhaustion of administrative remedies at
COAH.
COAH interpreted the applicable statute 95 to mean that "for
purposes of filing with the Council, a housing element need only be
prepared, and adoption is unnecessary."' 9 6 COAH analogized the
process for adopting a housing element to the process for revising a
zoning ordinance, as adoption of the element or ordinance are post192 Bi-County Dev. Corp. v. Oakland Borough, 224 N.J. Super. 455, 459, 540
A.2d 927, 929 (Law Div. 1988) (quoting Mount Laurel 111, 103 N.J. at 63, 510 A.2d at
654).
193 Id. at 458, 540 A.2d at 929.
194 Id. at 460, 540 A.2d at 930.
195 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-309, -311 (West 1986).
196 Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Township, 229 N.J. Super. 318, 326, 551 A.2d 547,
551 (App. Div. 1988).

1304

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1276

hoc revisions of a prior action. 19 7 The Hills Development court agreed
and held that such post-hoc adoptions do not affect the element's
validity under COAH's review because an adoption prior to submission to the COAH is not required. 9 8
More significant than this holding was the substantial deference
that the Hills Development court accorded COAH: .'.[A]n administrative agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing
is entitled to substantial weight." ' 19 9 Moreover, in Hills Development,
the appellate division was particularly willing to defer to COAH's
interpretation of its own statute because "'deference to an administrative agency is particularly appropriate where ...

new and innova-

'
tive legislation is being put into practice. "'200
With respect to whether the settlement agreement should have
been included with the housing element, the Hills Development court
found that neither the Fair Housing Act nor COAH's regulations
required such inclusion. Again, the judiciary deferred to COAH.
The Hills Development court stated that "[tihe Council's determination that inclusion of the settlement agreement into the housing element is not required for the element to be 'consistent with the rules

and criteria adopted by COAH .

. .,

should be given deference. "'201

COAH's administrative rules were directly challenged in
Bernards Township v. Department of Community Affairs. 02° Specifically,
Bernards and Cherry Hill Townships challenged the rules on both
substantive and procedural grounds. The appellate division set
forth standards for review that assured a strong measure of deference to COAH, afforded presumptive validity to its rules, and upheld all but one of the rules.
Regarding its review of COAH's rulemaking, the Bernards Township court set forth three standards:
First, if the rule is not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable
or irrational, it will be upheld.
Second, the rule must carry out the will of the legislature.
The regulation must fall within the express or implied grant of
power to the agency in the enabling legislation. However, a
specific grant of authority is to be liberally construed, unless
197 Id. at 327, 551 A.2d at 552.
198 Id. at 329-30, 551 A.2d at 553.
199 Id. at 329, 551 A.2d at 553 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
200 Id. (quoting Newark Firemen's Mut. Benevolent Ass'n v. Newark, 90 N.J. 44,
55, 447 A.2d 130, 135-36 (1982)).
201 Id. at 331, 551 A.2d at 554.
202 233 N.J. Super. 1, 558 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 1989).
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there is reasonable doubt that the Legislature has vested the
particular power in the administrative body.
03
Third, the rule must be adopted as required by law.
In addition, the appellate division asserted that there was a
strong presumption that the rules were valid unless arbitrary or ultra vires and that the plaintiff has the burden of overcoming such
presumptions. Finally, the court stated it must defer "to a choice of
procedures by an administrative agency to implement legislative
policy 'so long as the selection is responsive to the purpose and
function of the agency.' -204
Subsequently, municipalities challenged the rules relating to
credits, the twenty percent maximum set asides, municipal adjustments, distribution of need, three percent adjustments for municipal recreation and vacant land as criteria for distribution of need. In
each instance the court upheld the validity of the appellate rule with
the exception of the credit section, a ruling that warrants discussion
below.
The Fair Housing Act provides that "[m]unicipal fair share shall
be determined after crediting... each current unit of low and moderate income housing.., including any such housing constructed or
acquired as part of a housing program specially intended to provide
housing for low and moderate income households. 2 °5
In implementing this legislative intent, COAH imposed two
conditions on the one-for-one credit provision. First, COAH only
credited one-for-one "those housing units created or rehabilitated
after April 1, 1980. 12o6 Second, COAH sought to credit only "such
units [that] have been restricted to low or moderate income households ....
07 Regarding the first issue, the Bernards Township court
accorded COAH considerable deference. It recognized that
although COAH did not conduct a literal statutory interpretation,
the court found it acceptable to look beyond the language and evaluate the statute's and regulation's purpose. 20 8 Because it used 1980
census data, COAH had in effect already counted and credited all
pre-1980 low and moderate income housing. Thus it was necessary
to credit only the post-1980 census lower income housing. The
Bernards Township court recognized that the result was consistent
Id. at 8-9, 558 A.2d at 4 (citations omitted).
Id. at 9, 558 A.2d at 4-5 (quoting Radiological Soc'y of New Jersey v. New
Jersey State Dep't of Health, 208 N.J. Super. 548, 560, 506 A.2d 755, 761 (1986)).
205 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307(c)(1) (West 1986).
206 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 5:92-6.1(a).
203
204

207
208

Id. § 5:92-6.1(b).
Bernards Township, 233 N.J. Super. at 10, 12, 558 A.2d at 5, 6.
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with the legislative intent.20 9
This aspect of the credit section was an area of explicit concern
in Boonton Township and Mount Laurel III. In these cases, the Public
Advocate argued that a literal application of credits on a one-for2 0
one basis could result in credits far exceeding statewide need. ,
The Boonton Township court agreed that if the Act were so interpreted, the constitutionality of the credits provision would be difficult to sustain. 21 1 Thus, COAH's action may well have been in
response to the court's admonition that COAH was obligated to interpret the legislation so as not to render it constitutionally infirm,
and in addition to interpret the credits section to prevent an unconstitutional dilution of Mount Laurel's obligation.2 1 2 Viewed in this
manner, the court had an obligation to stretch to uphold COAH's
regulation over the language of the statute.
With respect to the second issue, the limitation of credits to
housing units that were restricted to lower income households, the
Bernards Township court found COAH's action to be ultra vires.
While this regulation may also have been an effort to prevent dilution of Mount Laurel's constitutional obligations through credits,
there was no basis in the Act for imposing such a restriction. Accordingly, the Bernards Township court found that because the council had exceeded its legal boundaries, the provision had to be
discarded.21 3
There are limits to the courts' willingness to defer to the legislature and COAH as demonstrated in the Carlton Homes challenge to
COAH's 1,000 unit cap rule. The appellate division, in a strongly
worded opinion, declared that:
The Legislature's enactment of the Fair Housing Act, and the
Supreme Court's willingness to defer to the Legislature's
choice of mechanisms to be used to satisfy the constitutional
obligations did not, however, result in an abdication of thejudiciary's obligation to review the reasonableness
and constitu2 14
tionality of the Council's actions.
The Carlton Homes court proceeded to find that application of a per
se absolute limit of 1000 units on a municipality's fair share obliga209 Id. at 12, 558 A.2d at 6.
210 Morris County Fair Hous. Council v. Boonton Township, 209 N.J. Super. 393,
429, 507 A.2d 768, 788 (Law Div. 1985).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 430, 507 A.2d at 789.
213 Bernards Township, 233 N.J. Super. at 13, 14, 558 A.2d at 6, 7.
214 Carlton Homes, Inc. v. COAH, 244 N.J. Super. 438, 449, 582 A.2d 1024,
1030 (App. Div. 1990).
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tion "substantially exacerbates disparity in the obligation imposed
on various municipalities in the same region and, therefore, clearly
demonstrates that the cap is unreasonable."2 1 5 Accordingly, the appellate division would not sustain the cap as a reasonable exercise of
COAH's authority under the Act. 2 16
COAH was empowered under the Act to adjust municipal fair
share if It]he established pattern of development in the community
would be drastically altered ....

-"

The Carlton Homes court ob-

served that COAH initially responded by adopting "a post-credit
fair share 'cap' of twenty percent of each municipality's 1987 occupied housing stock." '2 8 The 1000 cap limit was subsequently added
to the above provision by amendment, however. The effect was that
a municipality would not have a fair share that exceeded twenty percent of its 1987 occupied housing or 1000 units, whichever was
lower. The 1000 cap limit, as applied to Middletown Township, reduced its fair share number from 1850 units to 1000, approximately
the same as Freehold Township, although Freehold had only one
third as many total households.
In striking down this rule, the Carlton Homes court made clear
that it was the unreasonableness of COAH's action, and not that of
the legislature's, which invalidated the rule. The court explicitly
stated that "the legislature could not have intended that, under the
guise of protecting against a drastic alteration in one municipality,
9
other municipalities would be left in so disparate a position.- 21
The supreme court showed both deference and pragmatism in
Van Dalen. In that 1990 case, a Mount Laurel developer challenged
the Council's unwavering position regarding the SDGP as unreasonable because it was based on non-current information.2 2 ° Specifically, the developer contended that defendant Washington
Township's growth area, as reflected in the SDGP, was understated
and that the Township's fair share obligation should be increased to
reflect actual current data. 2 2 '
The Van Dalen court found that the Fair Housing Act required
COAH to use the unfinished State Plan. COAH's decision to rely
on the outdated SDGP until such time as the State Plan was com215
216
217
218
219
220

Id. at 453, 582 A.2d at 1033.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307(c)(2)(b) (West 1986).
Carlton Homes, 244 N.J. Super. at 450, 582 A.2d at 1030.
Id. at 453, 582 A.2d at 1033.
Van Dalen v. Washington Township, 120 N.J. 234, 245, 576 A.2d 819, 825

(1990).
221 Id. at 239, 576 A.2d at 822.
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pleted was upheld, however, by the supreme court.2 22 In doing so,
the Van Dalen court reaffirmed the reasons for deference articulated
in earlier lower court decisions:
We are satisfied that deference to COAH's reliance on the
SDGP is especially appropriate because the agency is charged
with the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, a new and
innovative legislative response to deal with the statewide need
for affordable housing. Because the legislative scheme is
novel, the implementation of its goals is necessarily an evolving process. Accordingly, COAH is entitled to a reasonable
degree of latitude, consistent with the legislative purpose, in
its effort to ascertain which planning and statistical
studies
2 23
best serve the long-term statutory objectives.
Based on the pragmatic reality that the SDGP was the only "'official determination of the state's plan for its own future development and growth"'' 2 24 and that the "its replacement has not been
completed, '2 2 5 the Van Dalen court found that it was a reasonable
determination for COAH to find that at present it was more advantageous to choose the administrative ease in the SDGP's planning
process as compared to the greater precision possibly accruing from
a more flexible formulation.2 2 6
B.

To What Extent Have the Courts Gotten Out of the Field of
Deciding Mount Laurel Cases?

It is not clear that the judiciary has left the Mount Laurel field.
Available evidence suggests that courts have been less involved,
but that evidence is less than overwhelming. Moreover, the available evidence only tells part of the story. There are many cases
in which the parties chose to remain in court rather than transfer
to COAH. Because many of those cases resulted in settlements,
their outcomes were not published. Accordingly, one must recognize that the following discussion is limited to the few cases
that are available.
Published decisions indicate that the courts have made an
effort to facilitate the transfer of cases to COAH. Mount Laurel III
established the guiding principles that "[i]t was the State's intention that every municipality would have the benefit of this comId. at 244, 576 A.2d at 824.
Id. at 246, 572 A.2d at 825.
Id. at 241, 576 A.2d at 823 (quoting Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 225, 456 A.2d
at 424).
225 Id. at 246, 576 A.2d at 825.
226 Id., 576 A.2d at 826.
222
223
224
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prehensive plan and its method of implementation ' 227 and that
the legislature intended to transfer all pending Mount Laurel ac22 8
tions to the Council.
To eliminate barriers to such transfer, the appellate division
held, in Trieste, Inc., II v. Gloucester Township,22 9 that transfer could

not be conditioned on the city's payment of costs. The supreme
court has also sought to remove incentives for plaintiffs to litigate
by holding that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees.230 In
Alexander's Dep't Stores of New Jersey, Inc. v. Paramus Borough2 3 1 the

Appellate Division sought to clarify which ancillary issues were
appropriate for resolution in the courts. Finally, in Fair Share
Housing Cr., Inc. v. Cherry Hill Township, 3 2 the appellate division
established that it will decide controversies that remain unresolved after exhaustion of COAH's procedures and remedies.
In Trieste H, Gloucester Township was engaged in Mount Laurel litigation prior to theJuly 1985 enactment of the Fair Housing
Act, but delayed its motion to transfer to COAH until March
1986, after the Mount Laurel III court determined that the legislature intended all Mount Laurel litigation to be transferred unless
extraordinary unfairness would result.233 Gloucester Township's
motion to transfer also came twenty days after judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs on the issue of site suitability. 234 Because the three day hearing on site suitability could have been
avoided had Gloucester Township filed a timely motion to transfer, the plaintiffs sought, and the trial court granted, costs (estimated at over $225,000)235 as a condition of transfer to COAH.

In reviewing the trial court's actions, the appellate division
found that there was no statutory deadline requiring a municipality to transfer cases involving exclusionary zoning that were initiated sixty days prior to the Act's effective date.2 36 The appellate
division recognized that the trial court possessed the inherent
227 Mount Laurel 11,

103 N.J. at 52, 510 A.2d at 648.

Id. at 53, 510 A.2d at 649.
229 215 N.J. Super. 184, 521 A.2d 864 (App. Div. 1987).
230 Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council of the Borough, 115 N.J. 536, 559 A.2d 1369 (1989).
231 243 N.J. Super. 157, 578 A.2d 1241 (App. Div. 1990).
232 242 N.J. Super. 76, 576 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1990).
233 Trieste H, 215 N.J. Super. at 186, 521 A.2d at 865.
234 Id. at 187, 521 A.2d at 865.
235 Id. at 186, 521 A.2d at 864-65.
236 Id. at 187, 521 A.2d at 865 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316(a) (West
1986)).
228
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power to assess costs as a condition of dismissal,23 7 but also observed that the exercise of such power in this case resulted in the
trial judge retroactively imposing a deadline for moving to transfer to COAH. The appellate court noted that COAH was free to
consider the record on the litigated issue of site suitability. The
Trieste II court then concluded that, in its interpretation of Mount
Laurel III, courts should allow cases involving exclusionary zoning instituted prior to the Act's effective date to be heard by the
Council, without costs. 2 3 8 The court further asserted that this

would be the case despite the possibility that the municipality
had been contumacious and prohibitive.2 39
In Urban League the supreme court considered plaintiffs' re24 0
quest for counsel fees under the Federal Fair Housing Act.
The court declared that the plaintiffs' request for award of counsel fees failed on two counts.
First, the plaintiffs were required to establish that the economic discrimination established in Mount Laurel II constituted
racial discrimination under Title VIII of the federal statute.241
Despite the opportunity to argue the Title VIII action, the plaintiffs failed to do so, a failure that "rather strongly suggests an
affirmative decision, if not a knowing acquiescence, in the
re' 242
moval of questions of racial discrimination from the case.
Second, the application for fees must be timely. The Urban
League court found that the plaintiffs' request for fees, after having made no mention of counsel fees during more than a decade
of active litigation, constituted an unreasonable delay for which
there was no justifiable explanation.2"3 In addition, the court
suggested that the undue delay threatened to precipitate unfair
surprise. 24 4 Finally, the Urban League court suggested that future
awards of counsel fees in Mount Laurel litigation would be unlikely.2 45 For fees to be properly awarded, it would require a case
involving a state claim of the Mount Laurel type and an allegation
concerning a Federal Fair Housing Act.246 It was unlikely that
Id. at 188, 521 A.2d at 866.
Id. at 190, 521 A.2d at 867.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988).
Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council of the Borough, 115 N.J. at 536, 541, 559 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1982).
242 Id. at 556, 559 A.2d at 1380.
243 Id. at 555, 559 A.2d at 1379.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 556, 559 A.2d at 1380.
246 Id.
237
238
239
240
241
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the requisite circumstances would exist because Mount Laurel
claims are largely adjudications before a state tribunal, a court or
COAH, under the State Fair Housing Act.2 4 7
Thus, in Trieste II and Urban League the court removed costs
as a barrier to transfer to COAH and eliminated the award of
counsel fees as an incentive for plaintiff litigation of Mount Laurel

issues.
In Alexander's, the appellate division advanced two noteworthy holdings. First, the court declared that taxpayer or neighbor
standing cannot be afforded under the Mount Laurel doctrine as
those two groups of citizens have no judicially cognizable interest
in the resolution of Mount Laurel litigation.2 4 8 The obvious impact of this holding is that it limits the number of parties who can
challenge a Mount Laurel action.
The second issue, relating to whether COAH or the courts
should decide legal questions of a Mount Laurel case, is more
complex and warrants greater discussion. The Council granted
substantive certification to Paramus's housing element and the
municipality subsequently adopted an ordinance incorporating
the housing element.2 4 9 Plaintiffs then filed a complaint in lieu of
prerogative writ. Among other issues, plaintiffs charged that the
agreement between the borough and the developer and the zoning amendments were ultra vires, the governing body improperly
entered into a contract not to alter its zoning scheme in the future, the amendments comprised invalid spot -zoning, the Borough failed to offer the proposed amendments to the planning
board for review, and the ordinance was vague, inconsistent, and
ambiguous and, therefore, invalid.2 5 ° In reviewing these complaints, the Alexander's court distinguished them from the kinds of
legal questions over which COAH has incidental jurisdiction to
decide, those being issues that grow directly out of COAH's proceedings.2 5 ' Specifically, the appellate division determined that:
Four things characterize these challenges; (1) they do not
question Paramus's satisfaction of its Mount Laurel duties, (2)
they are the kinds of attacks on municipal action that neighboring landowners or taxpayers have traditionally made by
prerogative writ, (3) they do not directly challenge any deci247

Id.

Alexander's Dep't Stores v. Paramus Borough, 243 NJ. Super. 157, 165, 578
A.2d 1241, 1245 (App. Div. 1990).
249 Id. at 161, 578 A.2d at 161.
250 Id. at 161-62, 578 A.2d at 1243-44.
251 Id. at 166, 578 A.2d at 1246.
248
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sion made by COAH, and (4) many of them concern issues
that did not ripen until after COAH granted substantive certification, when the governing body took action on the zoning
amendments.252

The Alexander's court determined that COAH's review and mediation procedures did not encompass the jurisdiction to hear and
rule on legal issues. 2 53 Accordingly, the court found that legal issues involving municipal action should be decided by the law division and that COAH proceedings should be left inviolate. 254 The
court then held that plaintiffs were not barred from raising these
issues in the law division but that the courts would restrain themselves from inviting collateral attacks on the Council's authority.2 5 5
In Cheny Hill Township,2 5 6 the appellate division determined that
if COAH's administrative procedures are exhausted without resolution, then the matter properly returns to the courts. Cherry Hill
Township appears to represent the kind of gross perversion of the
process against which the Mount Laurel III court warned. Cherry
Hill Township transferred its Mount Laurel case to COAH, engaged
in mediation, petitioned COAH for substantive certification of its
housing element based on the mediation agreement and then
sought to amend the plan to include unaccepted techniques rejected
in the mediation process.2 5 7 When it became clear that Cherry Hill
was not going to comply with its plan as submitted, COAH denied
substantive certification and returned the matter to the courts'
jurisdiction.2 5 8
The appellate court found that:
As to transferred cases, the COAH proceeding is a diversion
from the Law Division litigation with the objective of resolving
the issues within the FHA framework. But it is merely a diversion, i.e., a temporary suspension of the litigation. If the
COAH proceeding fails, 25then
the litigation, which has not
9
been dismissed, resumes.

Accordingly, the court ordered the plaintiff's exclusionary zoning
suit to resume in the law division.
The available evidence from these several cases indicates that
252
253
254

Id.
Id. at 168, 578 A.2d at 1247.
Id.

255

Id.

Fair Share Housing Ctr., Inc. v. Cherry Hill Township, 242 N.J. Super. 76,
576 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1990).
257 Id. at 79, 576 A.2d at 26.
258 Id. at 80, 576 A.2d at 26.
256

259

Id.at 82, 576 A.2d at 27.
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the courts are willing to facilitate the transfer of cases to COAH.
The judiciary has made clear, however, that it retains its right to
review the reasonableness and constitutionality of COAH's actions,
to decide legal questions that arise from a Mount Laurel case but that
relate more directly to municipal actions than to COAH proceedings, and to re-enter the scene when exhaustion of COAH's procedures fails to resolve the controversy. Based on these cases and on
the knowledge that many cases remained in court rather than transferring to COAH, one cannot conclude that the courts have "gotten
out of the Mount Laurel field." At best, one may posit that the courts
have merely reduced their involvement in the field.
C.

To What Extent Has the Supreme Court Sought to Ensure that the
Constitutional Obligation of the Mount Laurel Doctrine is
Met?
1. Fair Share

The components of "fair share" include a threshold determination of whether a given municipality has a fair share obligation, and if so, identification of the region to which it belongs; a
determination of the present and prospective regional need for
low and moderate income housing; and, an allocation of the fair
share of that need to the municipality. The result of this effort is
quantification of the number of low and moderate income housing units for which a municipality must provide a realistic opportunity through its land use ordinances. This number is then
adjusted to account for several capacity and policy
considerations.
The fair share number is, at best, a reasoned estimate of a
municipality's obligation. The fair share number is by no means
a scientific determination. There is a range of reasonable and
acceptable fair share methodologies that will pass constitutional
muster. With this in mind, it is useful to review the evolution of
fair share from Mount Laurel I through Mount Laurel III.
Mount Laurel I adopted the "developing municipality" standard. If a municipality sought the benefits of growth and development, it could not be excused from its burdens, such as
providing opportunities for low and moderate income housing.
This approach created much uncertainty and was rejected in
Mount Laurel II in favor of the State Development Guide Plan,
which was the only official document in the state that set forth a
statewide blueprint for future growth and development. The
Fair Housing Act anticipated that COAH would rely on the State
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Plan, to be prepared by the newly created State Planning Commission. Because the State Plan, which was to be completed in
1989, would not be adopted until at least 1993, COAH continued
to rely on the SDGP developed in 1980. The supreme court, for
largely pragmatic reasons, upheld this exercise of discretion in
Van Dalen.2 6 °
In Van Dalen, the plaintiff raised several meritorious arguments, such that the SDGP was outdated, that the SDGP understated the Township's growth areas, and that the municipality's
fair share burden should be increased. 2 6 ' When the new State
Plan is released in 1993, and incorporated by COAH, it will reflect growth for the past decade which, in turn, will increase existing municipal fair share numbers. In some cases, it will
establish a fair share obligation where none previously existed.
Regions have also evolved from Mount Laurel II, which established four regions that range from a high of eleven counties to a
low of two counties per region. By comparison, the Fair Housing
Act requires that regions consist of no more than four, nor less
than two, contiguous whole counties. Opponents claimed that
this requirement would have the effect of reducing the total present and prospective regional need, and thus a municipality's fair
share of such regional need. The supreme court upheld this provision as facially valid, however, and there has been no subsequent challenge to the actual regional determinations made by
COAH.
With respect to the determination and allocation of present
and prospective regional need, the Act represents a methodology
that results in a lesser numeric need than the methodology
adopted by Mount Laurel II. The statutory scheme allows a municipality to reduce its fair share through various credits, adjustments and limitations. Thus, the ultimate fair share number
under the Act is substantially lower than under the Mount Laurel
II methodology. For example, in Bi-County, Oakland Borough
had a Mount Laurel II obligation of 462 units compared with only
345 units under the Act.26 2 Moreover, Oakland could reduce by
up to fifty percent the number of units it had to provide within its
own boundaries if it entered into a regional contribution agreement with another municipality. Therefore, the Borough conVan Dalen v. Washington Township, 120 N.J. 234, 576 A.2d 819 (1990).
Id. at 237, 239, 576 A.2d at 820-21, 822.
Bi-County Dev. Corp. v. Oakland Borough, 224 N.J. Super. 455, 461, 540
A.2d at 927, 930 (Law Div. 1988).
260
261
262
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ceivably would have to provide a realistic opportunity for only
173 units within its border, a reduction of sixty percent from its
Mount Laurel II obligation.
Despite arguments that such reduction in the fair share
number unconstitutionally dilutes the Mount Laurel obligation,
the appellate division upheld the Act and its implementation by
COAH in Bernards Township and Carlton Homes, with two important
exceptions. The more noteworthy case for purposes of this section was Carlton Homes, wherein the court squarely addressed the
question of constitutional obligation. The appellate division was
called upon to decide whether the Council's adoption of a 1000unit cap complied with the Act and, if so, whether it's operation
would further violate the municipality's Mount Laurel constitutional obligation.263 The Carlton Homes court asserted that by deferring to the legislature and COAH, it had not abdicated its
responsibility to determine the reasonableness, as well as the
constitutionality, of COAH's actions.2
The court then proceeded to find that COAH's 1000-unit maximum fair share was
arbitrary, unreasonable and, therefore, invalid.
It is worth noting that in Carlton Homes the potential "windfall" to Middletown Township was grossly excessive. Middletown faced a precapped and precredited fair share obligation
of 1850 units. 26 5 Presumably, this figure would have been significantly higher under the Mount Laurel II methodology. By imposing the cap, Middletown's precredited fair share was limited to
1000 units. This number could presumably be reduced even further by credits. Finally, if the Township entered into a regional
contribution agreement, it could reduce the number of units for
which it must provide an opportunity within its boundaries to not
more than 500 units. The result was that Middletown could conceivably have reduced its fair share from 1850 units to not more
than 500, a reduction of 1350 units, or nearly seventy-five
percent.
Thus, with the exception of the 1000 cap limit in Carlton
Homes and the low income restriction on credits in Bernards Township, the courts have been reluctant to find that COAH's actions
fail to satisfy the constitutional obligation. Given this clear policy
of deference, combined with the broad range of reasonable ac263 Carlton Homes, Inc. v. COAH, 244 N.J. Super. 438, 448, 582 A.2d 1024,
1029 (App. Div. 1990).
264 Id. at 449, 582 A.2d at 1030.
265 Id. at 452, 582 A.2d at 1032.
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ceptability in fair share methodologies, the courts have upheld
COAH's determinations in all but the most flagrant cases.
2.

Realistic Opportunity

In Mount Laurel II, the supreme court defined "affirmative"
as being those actions the municipality would undertake and "realistic opportunity" as the likelihood that low and middle income
housing will in fact be constructed.2 6 It is clear that Mount Laurel
II achieved significant results. The Mount Laurel III decision
quantified these results as follows:
As of the time we entertained oral argument on the case
before us (January 6 and 7, 1986), some twenty-two Mount
Laurel cases had reached virtually final settlement. The total
fair share under those settlements was in excess of 14,000
units: given the terms of these settlements, it is highly probable that a substantial portion will be built. Given the sensitivity and dedication of the three Mount Laureljudges, we have no
doubt that our directions in Mount Laurel II were honored
scrupulously and that every development they allowed substantially conformed to sound zoning and planning2 and
6 7 would
have no substantial adverse environmental impact.
The current issues are whether municipalities have taken action
since Mount Laurel III and, if so, whether any such action has resulted in final fair share settlements that stand a realistic opportunity of actually being built. According to COAH's Monthly Status of
Municipalities Report, issued in April 1992, 176 municipalities have
voluntarily participated and 133 municipal housing elements have
received substantive certification as of March 31, 1991; the result
has been 17,365 fair share units.
The judiciary has facilitated these results through its deference
and support of COAH as it implements the statutory scheme for
meeting fair share obligations under Mount Laurel. It has also
sought to facilitate a realistic opportunity in two specific cases,
Holmdel Builders Association v. Holmdel Township 26 8 and Tocco v. Council
26 9
on Affordable Housing.
In Holmdel Township, several municipalities seeking to provide a
realistic opportunity for the construction of affordable housing
adopted ordinances imposing fees on developers as a condition for
266 Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 260-61, 456 A.2d at 442.
267 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 64, 510 A.2d at 654.
268

121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990).

269

242 N.J. Super. 218, 576 A.2d 328 (App. Div. 1990).
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development.2 70 The municipalities also set up affordable housing
trust funds and dedicated the developers' fees to such trusts. 2 7 '
These ordinances were challenged by several builders' associations
as ultra vires, an invalid tax, a taking withoutjust compensation and
a denial of due process.2 7 2
The Holmdel Township court defined the primary issue as
whether there is statutory authority in the Fair Housing Act, Municipal Land Use Law and general governmental police power that empowers a municipality to erect affordable housing development fees
as a prerequisite for development approval.2 73 The supreme court
characterized the ordinances at issue as affordable housing linkage
ordinances. The court found that developers must make an effort to
finance affordable housing construction as a precondition to obtaining a building permit or gaining access to density bonuses. 7 4
The court further opined that Holmdel's ordinance grants developers the opportunity of actually constructing lower income housing
units.2 7 5 Proponents of such linkage fees argued that
commercial developments increase the need for housing in
general and thus for affordable housing [and that] any land
that is developed for any purpose reduces the supply of land
capable of being used to build affordable housing.
[C]ommercial development ... consume[s] land, water, and
sewerage capacity that could otherwise be devoted to or held
for the satisfaction of the municipality's lower-income-housing
obligation.2 76
The court agreed with this reasoning and found that there was a
reasonable relationship between the development fees and an authorized purpose, i.e., the providing of a realistic opportunity for
the development of affordable housing. The supreme court determined that the development fees can be analogized to mandatory
set-asides.2 7 7 In addition, the court found that it was fair and reasonable for the fee requirements to be imposed upon private developers as they possess, enjoy and consume the land that comprises
property which can be used for housing stock. 278 Accordingly, the
Holmdel Township court concluded that development fees, as
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Holmdel Township, 121 N.J. at 561-62, 583 A.2d at 282-83.
Id. at 556, 583 A.2d at 280.
Id.
Id. at 558, 583 A.2d at 281.
Id. at 564, 583 A.2d at 284.
Id.
Id. at 565-66, 583 A.2d at 284, 285.
Id. at 573, 583 A.2d at 288 (citation omitted).
Id.
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mandatorily defined, do not violate COAH requirements, satisfy
standards of reasonableness as well as meet FHA requirements. 2 79
The court interpreted them to be other methods suggested by the
municipality.2 80
The court deferred to the legislature, however, by stressing that
the Fair Housing Act leaves specificities of compliance under the
Mount Laurel doctrine with COAH, the Council having the sole responsibility for implementation and development of the state's affordable housing policy. 28 ' The supreme court then proceeded to
point the way for COAH by determining that administrative
rulemaking would satisfy the interests of fairness and due process,
and that, to comply with the FHA inclusionary-zoning measures, the
agency's rulemaking must reasonably fulfill its legislative purposes.2 8 2 Finally, the court stated that COAH should promulgate
standards for development fees in order that municipalities have
guidelines to consider how to employ the fees as exclusionary-zoning devices, under the FHA, when designing their housing
elements .283
Thus, after reiterating the Mount Laurel II goal of encouraging
municipalities to fashion other means of satisfying fair share obligations,2 8 4 the Holmdel Township court was more than willing to affirm
the municipal efforts directed toward that end. While there was no
provision in the Act that explicitly empowered COAH to approve
development fees, neither was there an explicit prohibition. The
Holmdel Township court analogized development fees, which had
been judicially established in Mount Laurel II, to mandatory setasides 28 5 and found that these were the primary method of spurring
286
a municipality's willingness to comply.
The court determined that there was a rational relationship between the development fee and the legislative and constitutional
goal of providing a realistic opportunity for housing. The Holmdel
Township court then proceeded to craft the basis of COAH's authority to approve such development fees through the agency's rulemaking powers.
279 Id. at 574, 583 A.2d at 289 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311 (West
1986)).
280 Id.
281 Id. at 576, 583 A.2d at 290 (citation omitted).
282 Id. at 578, 583 A.2d at 291.
283 Id. at 579, 583 A.2d at 291.
284 Id. at 556, 583 A.2d at 280 (quoting Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 265-66, 456
A.2d 390, 445 (1983)).
285 Id. at 573, 583 A.2d at 288.
286 Id. at 563, 583 A.2d at 283.
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COAH has since promulgated rules that establish procedures
for retaining development fees.2 8 7 The rules require municipalities
to submit such ordinances to COAH for review and approval. To
provide relief to the Holmdel Township municipalities, the rules established procedures whereby municipalities that collected development fees for affordable housing trust funds prior to the Holmdel
Township decision could retain such funds. Consequently, by establishing the authority upon which COAH could approve affordable
housing linkage fees, the supreme court clearly facilitated a realistic
opportunity for the construction of affordable housing.
In Tocco, the court also sought to provide such a realistic opportunity by upholding an eighteen-month development moratorium
designed to preserve scarce land resources for affordable housing.2"8 The plaintiff-builder in Tocco appealed COAH's order restraining Cherry Hill from giving a development approval for a twoplus acre parcel.2 8 9 COAH based its determination on its administrative rules,2 9 which derived their substantive authority from
Mount Laurel III. In Mount Laurel III, the supreme court remarked
that COAH is vested with the authority to require a municipality to
provide for the preservation of resources essential in the Mount Laurel formula.2 9 ' Thus, relying on Mount Laurel III, the Tocco court facilitated a realistic opportunity by upholding a development
moratorium designed to preserve the necessary land resources upon
which affordable housing could be constructed.
On the other hand, the courts have been willing to defer to
COAH's approval of measures that, opponents claimed, would not
result in a realistic opportunity. In Carlton Homes, the plaintiff developers challenged COAH's accessory apartment rule 29 2 as invalid
under a theory that the rule lacked provision for realistic opportunities in the creation of units absent other incentives.2 93 That rule
established a pilot program whereby municipalities can satisfy their
fair shares by promulgating zoning schemes that create accessory
apartments in not more than three percent of dwelling units in individual municipalities that are good enough to convert to accessory
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 5:91-15.1 (1992).
Tocco v. Council on Affordable Housing, 242 N.J. Super. 218, 224, 576 A.2d
328, 331 (App. Div. 1990).
289 Id. at 221, 576 A.2d at 329.
290 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 91-11.1 (1986).
291 Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 61, 510 A.2d at 653.
292 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92-16.1 (1989).
293 Carlton Homes, Inc. v. COAH, 244 N.J. Super. 438, 454, 582 A.2d 1024,
1033 (App. Div. 1990).
287
288
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apartments .294
The Carlton Homes court determined that deference was particularly appropriate because COAH was implementing new and innovative legislation. 9 5 Moreover, the court appeared satisfied that
adequate safeguards were in place because if the accessory apartment rule failed to provide a realistic opportunity within two years,
the municipality would have to pursue alternative methods of meeting the obligation. 9 6
Thus, the evidence of these three cases is encouraging. The
Holmdel Township court, in a creative way, established the basis for
upholding affordable housing linkage fees that were designed to
provide a realistic opportunity for the actual construction of lower
income housing. In Tocco, the appellate division clearly preserved
the realistic opportunity by upholding COAH's eighteen-month
moratorium. In Carlton Homes the court was willing to let COAH
experiment, with sufficient safeguards, in determining what mechanisms would, in fact, produce a realistic opportunity.
It is too soon to decide whether the concept of realistic opportunity will continue to be viable. Thus far, the judiciary has sought
to create and preserve realistic opportunities for the construction of
affordable housing. Clearly, continuing efforts will be required.
3.

Implementation/Enforcement

In Mount Laurel III, the supreme court recognized that "the
municipalities' strong preference [is] to exercise their zoning
powers independently and voluntarily as compared to their open
hostility to court-ordered rezoning . . ..The court clearly
believed that the Mount Laurel doctrine's goal would be best
served through voluntary compliance with the statutory scheme
of the Fair Housing Act, which enjoyed a significant measure of
public and municipal acceptance.2 9 8 The court premonished,
however, that if the Act prolongs resolution of the issues
presented, the courts will again be forced to render help.2 9 9
Implementation of a constitutional obligation such as Mount
Laurel is an undertaking of enormous proportion. It is not
enough to establish the principle or to define the statutory
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 92-16.2(b) (1989)).
Id. at 455, 582 A.2d at 1033-34.
Id. at 455-56, 582 A.2d at 1034.
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 22, 510 A.2d at 632.
Id. at 22-23, 510 A.2d at 632-33.
Id. at 23, 510 A.2d at 633.

1993]

ESSA Y

1321

scheme. Nor is the establishment of an administrative agency
sufficient. Successful compliance with the constitutional obligation will require continued and determined enforcement by both
COAH and the courts. By analogy, the federal courts, nearly
forty years after Brown v. Board of Education,300 are still in the business of enforcing school desegregation plans that seek to comply
with the landmark case's constitutional principles. It would be
naive to think that the simple passing of a law and the establishing of an administrative agency would spur municipalities to
comply with the constitutional mandate of Mount Laurel.
The problems of implementation are twofold. First, with respect to those municipalities that have chosen to participate
through COAH, have the courts been willing to ensure compliance? In Trieste H, the court signaled its willingness to impose
costs on municipalities that grossly pervert the process. In Cherry
Hill Township, the court accepted the return of a case for COAH
where administrative remedies were exhausted without resolving
the issue and reinstated its Mount Laurel II procedure for handling such litigation. Finally, in Hasbrouck Heights,"0 ' the court
upheld COAH's determination that its substantive certification
could be amended, contrary to the mediated agreement, where
subsequent legislation relevant to the case would bar imposition
of a mediated provision.
Second, how can the courts ensure compliance by those municipalities that have chosen not to participate in COAH's procedures? Such municipalities do not escape a fair share obligation
to provide a realistic opportunity by virtue of their non-participation. That certain municipalities are non-participants suggests
the need for monitoring with enforcement action likely to follow.
In Trieste II, the appellate division demonstrated that sanctions are appropriate for municipalities that subvert the Mount
Laurel process. Gloucester Township sought transfer from the
courts to COAH less than three weeks after the issue of site suitability was adjudicated in the plaintiffs' favor. °2 The appellate
division held that the trial court should not have exercised its
power to impose costs on the Township as a condition of
transfer.
300 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 482 (1954) and Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
301 In the Matter of Petition for Substantive Certification of the Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, A-4149-89T2, A-4939-89T2 (N.J. App. Div. June 25, 1991), certif.
denied, 127 N.J. 554, 606 A.2d 367 (1991).
302 Id. at 187, 521 A.2d at 865.
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The court issued a stern reminder:
The [Mount Laurel III] court made it clear, however, that once
a municipality transferred its case to the Council an attempt by
it to return the case to court shortly before the Council was to
take final action "would constitute a gross perversion of the
purposes of the Act, as well as an imposition on both the
courts and the Council."
Thus by moving to transfer, Gloucester essentially submitted to the ultimate jurisdiction of the Council. Should it
later attempt to return the case to 3court, the court could then
30
consider the imposition of costs.

In Cherry Hill Township, the court took the next step and accepted the Cherry Hill case, back from COAH, for adjudication.
The Township initially transferred its Mount Laurel case from the
court to COAH in January, 1986. After exhausting COAH's administrative remedies, Cherry Hill sought to modify its mediated agreement by reinstating techniques eliminated through mediation that
were thought to be objectionable.30 4 COAH denied the township's
motion to amend and granted substantive certification based on the
mediated plan.30 5 When Cherry Hill refused to adopt the necessary
condition for implementation of the mediated housing element,
COAH revoked substantive certification and returned the case to
the courts.30 6
Cherry Hill sought to appeal COAH's action, but the appellate
court found that no resolution of the exclusionary zoning complaint
was present and that COAH's order continued to be interlocutory,
unappealable unless granted leave.30 7 The court then characterized
COAH's proceedings as a temporary proceeding outside the court
system attempting to resolve the questions presented under the
FHA framework.30 ' The court noted it temporarily suspended the
litigation and that, if the Council's actions failed, court adjudication
would resume. 30 9 Referring to Mount Laurel H's condemnation of
"appeal-engendered delay," the court saw no reason to deviate
from the approach established in Mount Laurel II, that being a proceeding followed by a lone appeal. 3 10 Finally, before dismissing
303

Id. (quoting Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 58, 510 A.2d at 651).

Fair Share Housing Ctr., Inc. v. Cherry Hill Township, 242 N.J. Super. 76, 79,
576 A.2d 24, 26 (App. Div. 1990).
304

305
306
307
308

309
310

Id.

Id. at 80, 576 A.2d at 26.
Id. at 81, 576 A.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
Id. at 82, 576 A.2d at 27.
Id.
Id., 576 A.2d at 27, 28.

1993]

ESSA Y

1323

Cherry Hill's appeal as interlocutory, the Cherry Hill Township court
observed that a municipality's attempt to use the appellate process
to achieve delay was an unacceptable result. 3 "
At issue in Hasbrouck Heights was COAH's controversial determination that a municipality must evaluate improved sites of two acres
or less upon the owner's stipulation that the site will be developed
with lower income affordable housing.3 12 In Hasbrouck Heights, there
was existing housing that would be demolished to make way for a
greater number of affordable units. In response to this politically
unacceptable outcome, the legislature enacted Chapter 142, which
provides that the Fair Housing Act is not to be interpreted to mandate that a municipality must satisfy a portion of its fair share obligation with property of two acres or less on which a habitable
1 3
residence is located that would be slated for demolition.
During the mediation, the Borough reluctantly agreed to rezone a tract of less than one acre containing three two-family houses
to permit construction of 45 market value units in exchange for the
developer's agreement to pay the Borough $180,000 for rehabilitation of existing housing.3 1 4 COAH granted substantive certification
to the mediated agreement. The Borough's attempt to adopt the
necessary ordinances was at first defective, however, and was subsequently challenged by local opposition. Accordingly, Hasbrouck
Heights, like Cherry Hill Township, moved to amend the substantive certification. As in Cherry Hill Township, COAH denied the motion and returned the matter to the law division, an action that the
Borough appealed. In the interim the above amendment to the Fair
Housing Act was enacted. Hasbrouck Heights successfully petitioned COAH to restore the Borough's certification, absent the previous requirement that appellants' site be utilized in its housing
element.3 1 5 The Hasbrouck Heights court held that the amendment of
the terms of the substantive certification was allowed.3 t 6 The court
reasoned that:
COAH furthered a Legislative policy expressed in c. 142.
Moreover, elimination of appellants' project did not impair
the policies behind the FHA because the project provided no
Id. at 83, 576 A.2d at 28.
In the Matter of Petition for Substantive Certification of the Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, A-4149-89T2, A-4939-89T2, at 6 (N.J. App. Div. June 25, 1991),
certif, denied, 127 N.J. 554, 606 A.2d 367 (1991).
313 Id.
314 Id. at 2-3.
315 Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
311

312

316

Id. at 9.
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low or moderate income housing. Appellants only contribution to the affordable housing goals of the FHA was through a
payment of $180,000, an amount the Borough now agrees to
fund.3 1 7
It is remarkable that there are so few cases dealing with enforcement action upon the exhaustion of COAH's administrative remedies and the presence of unresolved issues. This development may,
in part, be related to the second aspect of the enforcement problem
discussed above, namely that municipalities seeking to avoid complying with their constitutional obligation will most likely not participate in COAH's procedures. In those limited cases where the
court has been called upon to take enforcement action, municipalities have responded appropriately.
One may anticipate that there will be more cases like Hasbrouck
Heights as Mount Laurel's implementation phase produces analogous
and politically unacceptable results. This trend is more likely to occur when the economy improves and more housing is developed.
Moreover, it is likely to occur when the State Development and Redevelopment Plan is released in 1993. The Plan will likely impose
greater fair share numbers in many instances and, thus, create fair
share obligations in municipalities where none previously existed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Several conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis of
post-Mount Laurel III litigation. First, the judiciary has deferred,
to a significant extent, to the legislature, COAH and the statutory
scheme for meeting the Mount Laurel constitutional obligations.
The judiciary has adopted COAH's methodologies as its own in
cases that remain in the courts. The courts have upheld COAH's
procedural and substantive rules and, in so doing, have indicated
that deference to COAH is particularly appropriate due to the
agency's implementation of new and innovative legislation. 8
Only when COAH's rules are plainly contrary to the Fair Housing Act have the courts invalidated COAH's rules, and then only
in two instances.31 9
Second, less clear is the extent to which the courts have reId. at 9-10.
See, e.g., Van Dalen v. Washington Township, 120 N.J. 234, 576 A.2d 819
(1990); Carlton Homes, Inc. v. COAH, 244 N.J. Super. 438, 582 A.2d 1024 (App.
Div. 1990), Hills Development Co. v. Bernards Township, 229 N.J. Super. 318, 551
A.2d 547 (App. Div. 1988).
317
318

319

See Bernards Township v. Department of Community Affairs, 233 N.J. Super.

1558 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 1989) (restriction of credits to lower income housing units);
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treated from the Mount Laurel field. The available evidence, in
the form of published opinions, suggests that courts have reduced their involvement in Mount Laurel cases. There are, however, only three post-Mount Laurel III supreme court and twelve
appellate court decisions. The courts have made an effort to facilitate the transfer of cases to COAH by not requiring payment
of costs as a condition of transfer. Moreover, the courts have
removed the award of attorney's fees as an incentive in Federal
Fair Housing Act/Mount Laurel claims. The judiciary has been
willing to re-enter the field, however, where recalcitrant municipalities seek to pervert the process.
There is no evidence available regarding the number of
cases that the courts have handled involving municipalities that
chose to refrain from participating in COAH's procedures. Accordingly, a thoroughly informed conclusion concerning the extent to which the judiciary has withdrawn from the Mount Laurel
field cannot be drawn. It is reasonable, however, to suggest that
where municipalities have elected to participate in COAH's procedures the courts have significantly reduced their involvement
and deferred to COAH.
Third, the judiciary has sought to ensure that Mount Laurel's
constitutional obligations are met, recognizing that there is a reasonable range of actions that pass constitutional muster. The
available evidence demonstrates that there are significantly fewer
fair share obligations under the Fair Housing Act/COAH approaches than under Mount Laurel II methodologies. While permitting COAH some latitude in identifying what methodologies
constitute realistic opportunities, the courts have been willing to
rebuke COAH for seeking to institute a 1000 unit per se limit on
a municipal fair share. The courts have also been willing to take
necessary enforcement actions in cases where municipalities have
exhausted COAH's administrative remedies.
Finally, with respect to the future role of the courts, it is reasonable to posit that the judiciary will increase its involvement in
the Mount Laurel field. Such involvement is likely for several reasons. First, there is ample precedent for judicial involvement.
Second, objective events are likely to require the courts' involvement. Third, policy considerations suggest the need for further
involvement.
In Mount Laurel III, the supreme court warned that it would
Carlton Homes, Inc. v. COAH, 244 N.J. Super. 438, 582 A.2d 1024 (App. Div.
1990) (1,000 unit cap on municipalities' fair share obligations).
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re-enter the field if the Fair Housing Act resulted only in delay.
Indeed, the appellate division has demonstrated its willingness to
do so, especially in cases involving recalcitrant municipalities
such as Cherry Hill 320 and Gloucester Township.3 2 1 Thus, there
is both a basis and a willingness for the courts to re-enter the
Mount Laurel field.
Several events that will occur in the near future will create
conflicts that may need to be resolved by the courts. In 1993, the
State Plan is due to be completed and, soon thereafter, the sixyear statutory repose from Mount Laurel litigation will begin to
expire for a number of municipalities. In Van Dalen, the supreme
court, for largely pragmatic reasons, upheld COAH's decision to
continue to use the outdated SDGP in the absence of the new
State Plan.3 22 In 1993, with a completed State Plan, COAH will
be compelled, by both the Act and Van Dalen, to apply it. The
State Plan will reflect more than a decade of growth and development throughout the state. As a result of this development, fair
share obligations will be increased for many municipalities and
imposed on other municipalities that were never before obligated
under Mount Laurel.
Consequently, the State Plan will provide developers and
housing coalitions with a basis for seeking to assert higher fair
share obligations. Municipalities, which may be expected to oppose the imposition of higher fair share obligations, may find
themselves vulnerable to litigation as the six-year statutory repose expires. To the extent that the economy improves during
this period the increased housing demand will create yet another
pressure. Thus, the confluence of the State Plan's completion,
the expiration of the six-year repose for litigation and improved
economic conditions will most probably inspire a new round of
litigation.
Policy considerations also suggest judicial involvement. The
voluntary nature of COAH's procedures will likely emerge as an
issue after the State Plan's release. According to COAH's statistics, only 176 municipalities have participated in its procedure.
COAH estimates that an additional seventy municipalities have
gone to court and then settled instead of availing themselves of
320 See Fair Share Housing Ctr. v. Cherry Hill Township, 242 N.J. Super. 76, 576
A.2d 24 (1990).
321 See Trieste, Inc., II v. Gloucester Township, 215 N.J. Super. 184, 521 A.2d
864 (1987).
322 Van Dalen v. Washington Township, 120 N.J. 234, 576 A.2d 819 (1990).

1993]

ESS.4 Y

1327

the COAH procedure. Accordingly, there are approximately 320
municipalities that have neither participated through COAH nor
resolved their case in court. Once the State Plan is released, municipalities that do not have a regional fair share obligation can
be identified and subtracted from this group of approximately
320.
The issue of the remaining municipalities, which may
number as many as fifty percent of New Jersey's 567 municipalities, will have to be considered. To the extent that these municipalities have not addressed their constitutional obligation under
Mount Laurel, the courts may be compelled to act. In Carlton
Homes, the appellate division indicated that it could not have been
the legislature's intention that municipalities would be placed in
such an unwavering position3 2 3 by virtue of the 1000 per se fair
share limit. Faced with a voluntary non-participation rate as high
as fifty percent, the judiciary may be forced to deal with the issue
of whether the legislature could have intended such a disparate
effect. An even more'compelling concern is whether it is possible
under COAH and the Act, to meet the constitutional obligation
imposed by Mount Laurel if as many as half of all municipalities do
nothing.
323

Carlton Homes, 244 N.J. Super. at 453, 582 A.2d at 1033.

